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ARTICLES 
The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of 
Originalism 
RANDY E. BARNETT* & EVAN D. BERNICK** 
The concept of constitutional construction is of central importance to 
originalist theory but is both underdeveloped and controversial among 
originalists. Some object that its apparent open-endedness undermines 
the constraining virtues of originalism and exposes citizens to arbitrary 
judicial power. In this Article, we respond to this challenge by presenting 
an originalist theory of constitutional construction that can guide and 
constrain judicial activity within the “construction zone.” When com-
bined with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation, our 
approach yields a unified theory of originalism. 
Our theory of constitutional construction draws upon a familiar 
common-law concept long used in contract and fiduciary law to handle 
the problem of opportunistic abuse of discretion: the duty of good faith. 
We contend that judges who take an oath to “support this Constitution” 
enter into a fiduciary relationship with private citizens—a relationship 
characterized by discretionary powers in the hands of judges and a corre-
sponding vulnerability in the citizenry. As fiduciaries, judges are morally 
and legally bound to follow the instructions given to them in “this 
Constitution” in good faith. This means that judges engaging in constitu-
tional construction (or “implementation”) must seek to give legal effect to 
both the Constitution’s “letter” (its original public meaning) and its “spi-
rit” (the original function or purpose of the particular clauses and general 
structure of the text). 
Therefore, when interpretation of original meaning is not sufficient 
to resolve a controversy, judges have a duty to employ good-faith con-
struction. Good-faith construction consists of (a) accurately identifying 
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1 
the spirit—or “original function”—of the relevant constitutional provi-
sion at the time it was enacted and (b) devising implementing rules that 
are calculated to give effect to both the letter and the spirit of the text in 
the case at hand and in future cases. Conversely, bad-faith construction 
consists in opportunistically using the discretion inherent in implement-
ing the Constitution to evade its original letter or spirit in pursuit of the 
judge’s own extraconstitutional preferences.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Interpretation differs from construction in that the former “is the act of finding 
out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the sense which their author 
intended to convey; and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea 
which the author intended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the 
drawing of conclusions . . . which are in the spirit, though not in the letter of 
the text.”—Justice Thomas M. Cooley1  
I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without 
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will 
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon 
me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me 
God.—Federal Judicial Oath2 
Constitutional originalism is defined by a commitment to the original meaning 
of the letter of the constitutional text. Our thesis is that originalism must be com-
mitted to the Constitution’s original spirit as well—the functions, purposes, goals, 
or aims implicit in its individual clauses and structural design. We term this 
spirit-centered implementation “good-faith constitutional construction.” 
Originalism is the view that the meaning of the Constitution remains the same 
until it is properly changed, with an Article V amendment being the only proper 
method of revision.3 Originalists hold that: (1) the meaning of a provision of the 
Constitution was fixed at the time it was enacted (the “Fixation Thesis”); and 
(2) that fixed meaning ought to constrain constitutional decisionmakers today  
1. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *38 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 
1871) (emphasis added) (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENUTICS 11 (William G. 
Hammond ed., St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 3d ed. 1880)). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (emphasis added). 
3. The idea that originalism is a theory of constitutional change has been emphasized by Professor 
Stephen Sachs. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817 (2015). 
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(the “Constraint Principle”).4 Over the past thirty years, originalist thought has 
evolved with respect to how the meaning of constitutional text was fixed. 
The 1990s gave rise to the “New Originalism.”5 Whereas the New Originalism 
contended that the meaning of constitutional text was fixed by the communicative 
content that it conveyed to the general public at the time of ratification—its “orig-
inal public meaning,” as famously proposed by Justice Antonin Scalia6—the “old 
originalism” maintained that the meaning of the Constitution was fixed by the 
intentions of the Constitution’s Framers. 
Second, whereas many new originalists distinguished between two different 
activities—interpretation and construction—the old originalism tended to run 
these two activities together. Under New Originalism, “interpretation” means the 
activity of ascertaining the communicative content of the text.7 “Construction” 
means the activity of giving that content legal effect—typically (but not exclu-
sively) by developing implementing rules through which the text will be applied 
in particular contexts. These implementing rules are not part of the communica-
tive content of the text.8 
Closely related to the second of these positions was a third: some New 
Originalists—including one of us—insisted that the usage of the terms “origina-
list” and “originalism” is properly confined to the activity of interpretation.9 
Barnett, supra note 7, at 69 (“Originalism is not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs 
out.”). We always agreed with Professor Lawrence Solum that originalist constitutional construction must 
conform to what Solum calls the “constraint principle” insofar as constitutional constructions must, at 
minimum, be consistent with the original meaning of the constitutional text. See Solum, supra note 4, at 8 
(“All or almost all originalists can agree on a minimum level constraint: the doctrines of constitutional law 
and decisions in constitutional cases should be consistent with the original meaning—subject to limited 
and exceptional defeasibility conditions.”). We propose here that the constraint on construction goes 
beyond the minimum of “consistency” and contend that construction can be originalist “all the way 
down.” Thus, we affirm a version of what Solum has called “constraint as derivability.” See Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 24–25 (Mar. 24, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215 [https://perma.cc/ 
ABZ4-3WV8]. 
According to this position, whatever one decides is the best method of giving 
legal effect to text, it cannot be originalist because that method will not be textu-
ally specified; and therefore, by definition, constitutional construction must be 
“nonoriginalist.” 
4. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015). 
5. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 626 (1999) 
(“[T]he ascendent New Originalism [is] based, not on original intent, but original meaning.”); Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 607–12 (2004). 
6. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 47 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997). 
7. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011); 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010). 
8. Although the texts of both the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments do provide rules of construction, 
these too need additional implementing rules to give them legal effect. We have in mind such 
implementing rules as the “presumption of liberty” for the former or “state sovereign immunity” for the 
latter. 
9. 
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The postulate that constitutional construction is inherently nonoriginalist is 
mistaken and has led to unnecessary division among originalists. Most impor-
tantly, it may have led some originalists—including Justice Scalia—to reject the 
interpretation–construction distinction entirely. Originalist critics of the distinc-
tion have raised concerns that legitimating nonoriginalist methods of construction 
seriously undermines, if not entirely eliminates in practice, the “constraint” pro-
vided by originalist interpretation.10 
We now believe that construction not only can but must be originalist. In this 
Article, we present an originalist theory of constitutional construction: good-faith 
constitutional construction. Good-faith constitutional construction seeks to 
implement the Constitution faithfully by ascertaining and adhering to the original 
functions of the constitutional text—its “spirit.” 
We hope that integrating both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution into a 
unified theory of originalism will not only unify modern originalists who have di-
vided over the interpretation–construction distinction, but also unify original 
public meaning originalists with originalists who remain intentionalists.11 If 
“intentions” are understood as the functions of particular constitutional provi-
sions or of constitutional design—as distinct from any subjective expectations 
concerning how particular provisions would be applied—we believe intentions 
should guide and constrain constitutional construction.12 
We also believe that this unified theory of originalism helps distinguish origi-
nalism from some purposive versions of living constitutionalism. On our account, 
first comes the original meaning or letter of a provision (interpretation), and then, 
to implement that meaning, comes its original spirit or function (construction). 
That is, construction must neither precede interpretation nor give rise to a rule 
that contradicts original meaning. 
10. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1371 (2009) (expressing concern that construction-proponent Jack Balkin’s 
approach “dissolves the distinction between originalism and living constitutionalism”); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and 
the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 753 (2009) (arguing that “[c]onstitutional 
construction . . . exacerbates agency costs, because it allows interpreters to employ discretion rather than 
requiring them to follow the guidance furnished by the original constitution-making process”); Richard 
S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
ONLINE 1, 3 (2017) (“[C]onstruction—as it appears in the current literature—leaves a wide discretion to 
officials and especially to judges employing it.”). 
11. Prominent intentionalists include Larry Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash, and Richard Kay. See 
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free 
Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 971 (2004); Richard S. Kay, Original 
Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009). 
12. We do not mean to imply that Alexander, Kay, or Prakash understand intentions in this limited 
sense. Rather, all three scholars hold that texts mean what their authors intended them to mean. In our 
terms, their theories are primarily theories of the meaning of the letter of legal text. We thank Lawrence 
Solum for this observation. We suspect that, because the “spirit” is so closely related to the “letter” as 
sometimes to be indistinguishable—and because both are the subject of historical inquiry—this has 
induced some intentionalists to reduce both into the “letter.” But this is only a hunch. 
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The move that we are making preserves originalism as a distinctive theory. We 
maintain that the spirit of the Constitution cannot be used as a justification for 
updating or overriding the original meaning of its letter. Nor can the purposes or 
objectives of today’s constitutional decisionmakers override the original func-
tions of the text.13 
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps. In Part I, we revisit the develop-
ment of originalism and home in on a schism that has developed between origina-
lists concerning the interpretation–construction distinction. 
In Part II, we lay the constitutional foundations for our approach to construc-
tion. Drawing upon the pioneering scholarship of Robert Natelson, Gary Lawson, 
and Guy Seidman, we contend that judges were understood to be public fiducia-
ries at the time of ratification and to have duties that tracked those of private fidu-
ciaries. We focus on two fiduciary duties: the duty to follow instructions and the 
duty to act in good faith. We argue that the voluntary assumption of office accom-
panied by the express oath to “support this Constitution” required by Article VI 
creates a fiduciary relationship that binds all government officials to follow 
instructions and act in good faith.14 We further argue that the oath imposes a 
moral and legal duty upon judges to engage in good-faith interpretation and 
construction. 
In Part III, we draw upon Steven Burton’s seminal “foregone opportunities” 
theory of good-faith performance to articulate our approach to constitutional con-
struction.15 We argue that the duties of good faith in both contract law and fiduci-
ary law are designed to thwart opportunism and that Burton’s theory can serve as 
a framework for evaluating the good faith of our judicial fiduciaries. In the consti-
tutional context, this framework constrains conscientious judges from using the 
discretion they have to devise implementing doctrine in a manner that under-
mines their oath to adhere faithfully to the text of the Constitution. 
In Part IV, we set forth guidelines for good-faith constitutional construction. 
We argue that, in what Lawrence Solum has termed the “construction zone,”16 
judges should identify the original functions of individual clauses and structural 
design elements to formulate rules that are consistent with the Constitution’s let-
ter and calculated to implement its spirit.17 
Solum’s influence on originalist theory and on the refinement of the interpretation–construction 
distinction has been enormous. For a sampling of his path breaking work, see Solum, supra note 16; 
Solum, supra note 7; Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 923 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, Heller and Originalism]; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic 
Conversely, bad-faith construction 
consists of evading the Constitution’s spirit and pursuing extralegal goals. 
13. In future work, we intend to apply this conception of “good-faith constitutionalism” to the 
discretion exercised by legislators and executive branch officials. 
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
15. See Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor 
Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 504–05 (1984); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common 
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 (1980). 
16. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453, 458 (2013) (explaining that constitutional decision makers enter the construction zone when “the 
constitutional text does not provide determinate answers to constitutional questions”). 
17. 
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Originalism (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 
2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 [https://perma.cc/BJV7-U9SV]; 
see also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1867–1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153, 261 (2009) (“I do not think 
anyone should write or speak above a whisper about originalist theory without confronting Solum’s 
work.”); Jeremy Kessler & David Pozen, Some Legal Realism About Legal Theory (Columbia Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 14-584, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126412 
[https://perma.cc/RC4H-WX9X] (describing Solum as a “leading originalist”). 
In Part V, we use our theory of construction to evaluate constitutional doctrine. 
First, we highlight a good-faith construction of the right to keep and bear arms. 
We then turn to an example of bad-faith construction: the “substantial effects” 
doctrine, which has greatly extended congressional power to regulate the national 
economy. 
In Part VI, we consider the objections that our theory is just old originalism re- 
packaged; that, even if it is distinguishable from old originalism, it is vulnerable 
to similar criticism; that the interpretation–construction distinction is neither nec-
essary nor useful; and that judges who seek the Constitution’s spirit will be led 
astray. 
I. THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED THEORY: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ORIGINALISM 
The history of originalism has been told many times.18 To demonstrate the 
need for a unified theory of originalism, however, we must first trace the develop-
ment of originalism from the first appearance of the term “originalism” in consti-
tutional law scholarship to the development and refinement of a defensible theory 
of originalism, and finally to a schism that has arisen within originalism that we 
aim to heal. 
A. INTRODUCING THE TERM “ORIGINALISM” 
Although we maintain that originalism as a method of constitutional interpreta-
tion is as old as the Constitution itself, the roots of originalism as a distinctive 
theory of interpretation can be traced back to 1980. That was the year Stanford 
law professor Paul Brest published his now-classic critique of originalism, The 
Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,19 in the Boston University Law 
Review. 
Brest was vague as to which scholars were the targets of his criticism, but judg-
ing from the frequency of his examples, Brest’s primary target appeared to be 
Harvard researcher Raoul Berger, whose book Government by Judiciary was  
 
18. For sympathetic accounts by originalists, see Barnett, supra note 5, at 612–21; Vasan Kesavan & 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003); Whittington, supra note 5, at 599–612; Solum, supra note 16, at 462–68. For 
a comprehensive overview by a historian, see JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2007). For a critical review of the literature, see Logan E. 
Sawyer III, Principle and Politics in the New History of Originalism, 57 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 198, 198 
(2017) (“We have gone from too few histories of originalism to too many . . . .”). 
19. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). 
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published just three years earlier.20 A secondary target was Yale law professor 
Robert Bork.21 It was Brest who first dubbed Berger and Bork “originalists” and 
their approach “originalism”—a term that had not previously been used in the 
constitutional context: “By ‘originalism’ I mean the familiar approach to consti-
tutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution 
or the intentions of its adopters.”22 Brest contrasted originalism with “what I shall 
call ‘nonoriginalism.’”23 Brest’s article may well have provided the most influen-
tial labeling scheme in the history of constitutional law scholarship. 
Brest conceded up front that, “[a]t least since Marbury, in which Chief Justice 
John Marshall emphasized the significance of our Constitution’s being a written 
document, originalism in one form or another has been a key theme in the 
American constitutional tradition.”24 But, nevertheless, Brest took aim at what he 
called “strict originalism,” which he said was characterized by its “strict inten-
tionalism.”25 “For the strict intentionalist, ‘the whole aim of construction, as 
applied to a provision of the Constitution, is . . . to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of its Framers and the people who adopted it.’”26 
Brest then identified the problem with strict intentionalism: 
Strict intentionalism requires the interpreter to determine how the adopters 
would have applied a provision to a given situation, and to apply it accord-
ingly. The enterprise rests on the questionable assumption that the adopters of 
constitutional provisions intended them to be applied in this manner. But even 
if this were true, the interpreter confronts historiographic difficulties of such 
magnitude as to make the aim practicably unattainable.27 
For Brest, these “historiographical difficulties” arise by moving from the 
potentially ascertainable intentions of individual persons to deriving institutional 
intent from the myriad subjective intentions of all the members of the decision-
making bodies that were responsible for the Constitution’s adoption. Brest 
regarded this as a fool’s errand.28 This general line of objection has come to be  
20. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1977). 
21. See Brest, supra note 19, at 223 (citing Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971)). 
22. Id. at 204. 
23. Id. at 205. 
24. Id. at 204. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Sutherland, J., 
dissenting)). 
27. Id. at 222–23 (emphases added). The astute reader will notice that “apply it accordingly” is 
actually describing constitutional implementation or construction, not the identification of meaning or 
interpretation. This is now commonly referred to as “original expected application.” See Jack M. 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 (2007). 
28. See Brest, supra note 19, at 212–13. 
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called the “summing problem”29—that is, the problem of identifying and 
then somehow adding up or “summing” subjective intentions into collective 
intentions. 
Only after Brest invented the term “originalism” did originalists adopt the label 
and defend it.30 Perhaps the earliest, most visible embrace was that of Edwin 
Meese III, who was President Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General during 
Reagan’s second term. In his address to the American Bar Association on July 9, 
1985, Meese declared for “a jurisprudence of original intention.”31 
Meese’s address created quite a stir. At a conference at Georgetown University 
Law Center, Justice William Brennan took the opportunity to reply to the 
Attorney General. Echoing Brest, Brennan declared: 
[I]t is far from clear whose intention is relevant—that of the drafters, the con-
gressional disputants, or the ratifiers in the states—or even whether the idea of 
an original intention is a coherent way of thinking about a jointly drafted docu-
ment drawing its authority from a general assent of the states.32 
Although the battle lines were now publicly drawn, originalism’s only theoreti-
cal explication remained Paul Brest’s critical reconstruction. For this reason, 
Lawrence Solum has dubbed early writers like Berger and Bork “proto- 
Originalists.”33 But a theory of originalism was in the offing. 
B. ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING, NOT FRAMERS’ INTENT 
Early discussion and development of originalism as a theory was initiated 
by the lawyers in the Meese Justice Department. In a span of four years, its 
ranks included such future law professors as Bradford Clark, Robert 
Delahunty, John Harrison, Gary Lawson, Nelson Lund, John Manning, John 
McGinnis, Richard Nagareda, John C. Nagle, Michael Stokes Paulsen, and 
Michael Rappaport.34 
As these DOJ lawyers met in seminars and produced blue books on the original 
meaning of various constitutional provisions, they were addressed by then- 
Circuit Court Judge Antonin Scalia. Inspired in part by his antipathy towards the 
judicial use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, Scalia admonished 
29. The term appears to have been first used in Robert Bennett, Originalist Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 355 (1988). 
30. The first academic defender of “originalism” after Brest took aim at it was Richard Kay. See 
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections 
and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 244 (1988). 
31. See Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address before the American Bar Association (July 9, 
1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 9 (1986). 
32. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 
S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986). 
33. Solum, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
34. Also in the group were future Justice Samuel Alito; future judges Michael Luttig and Steven 
Markman; constitutional litigators Michael Carvin, Charles Cooper, and Theodore Olson; and lawyer– 
author James Swanson. 
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the DOJ attorneys to abandon their quest to discover the original intentions of the 
Framers and to pursue instead the original public meaning of the text.35 
After they left the government in the 1990s, many of these lawyers began mak-
ing important contributions to originalist scholarship as law professors.36 But it 
fell to Gary Lawson, first at Northwestern and then at Boston University, to 
expand upon Scalia’s concept of original public meaning in a series of essays.37 
Others followed suit.38 
The shift from Framers’ intent to original public meaning was responsive to 
Brest’s critique of “strict intentionalism.” Gone was the need to ascertain the col-
lective intentions of decisionmaking bodies. This shift transformed what was, in 
practice, a counterfactual inquiry into what the Framers of the Constitution would 
have thought of some contemporary issue, into an empirical investigation of lin-
guistic usage. 
The move from Framers’ intent to public meaning was the first big step in for-
mulating a defensible theory of originalism. The next big step was taken, not by a 
judge or a law professor, but by a political scientist. 
C. THE INTERPRETATION–CONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION 
In 1999, Keith Whittington published two books in which he distinguished 
between (a) endeavoring to ascertain the communicative content of constitutional 
text and (b) making constitutional judgments when that endeavor fails to yield a 
single determinate answer—when the text “runs out.”39 The first of these activ-
ities he called constitutional interpretation,40 and the second constitutional 
construction.41 
35. Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic 
Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 
101, 103–04 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice ed., 1987). 
36. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
37. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997) 
[hereinafter Lawson, On Reading Recipes]; Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992). 
38. See works cited supra note 36. Prakash now identifies as an intentionalist. See Larry Alexander & 
Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 
20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 100 (2003) (“[W]e are intentionalists and believe that the meanings of words 
are those meanings intended by the author(s) or speaker(s).”). 
39. For a thorough exploration of the distinctions between determinacy, indeterminacy, and 
underdeterminacy, see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). In brief, a legal question has a single determinate answer “if and only if the 
set of results that can be squared with the legal materials contains one and only one result.” Id. at 473. A 
question is indeterminate “if and only if the set of results . . . that can be squared with the legal materials 
is identical with the set of all imaginable results.” Id. A question is underdeterminate “if and only if the 
set of results . . . that can be squared with the legal materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all 
imaginable results.” Id. 
40. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL 
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). 
41. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). 
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Although unfamiliar to constitutional scholars—originalists and nonoriginal-
ists alike—when Whittington advanced it, the interpretation–construction distinc-
tion can be found in constitutional theory as early as the 1830s.42 
See LIEBER, supra note 1, at 44; see also Ralf Poscher, The Hermeneutic Character of Legal 
Construction, in LAW’S HERMENEUTICS: OTHER INVESTIGATIONS 207, 207 (Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard, 
eds., 2017). See generally Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 1: Francis Lieber, NEW PRIVATE LAW: 
PROJECT ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW (Nov. 19, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19/ 
interpretation-and-construction-1-francis-lieber-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/X4AH-MAXD]; Greg Klass, 
Interpretation and Construction 2: Samuel Williston, NEW PRIVATE LAW: PROJECT ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
PRIVATE LAW (Nov. 23, 2015), https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/23/interpretation-and-construction-2- 
samuel-williston-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/3CWS-W2Q5]; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: 
Arthur Linton Corbin, NEW PRIVATE LAW: PROJECT ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/25/interpretation-and-construction-3-arthur-linton-corbin-greg-klass/ 
[https://perma.cc/AP7C-WZZS]. 
In a 1839 
treatise, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, legal scholar Francis Lieber formally 
distinguished between interpretation and construction, defining “construction” as 
“the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond the direct expres-
sion of the text, from elements known from and given in the text—conclusions 
which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the text.”43 
In 1868, Thomas McIntyre Cooley incorporated Lieber’s distinction into a con-
stitutional treatise that became highly influential in the late nineteenth century. 
Cooley was a professor at the University of Michigan Law School from 1859 to 
1884—serving as its dean from 1871 to 1883—and the Chief Justice of the 
Michigan Supreme Court from 1864 to 1885. His A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States 
of the American Union, was published the same year that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified.44 
In a chapter on the construction of state constitutions, Cooley explained that 
interpretation differs from construction in that the former “is the act of finding 
out the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense which their author 
intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea  
42. 
 
43. LIEBER, supra note 1, at 44 (emphasis added). How did this distinction become lost and 
unfamiliar when it was delineated by one of the most eminent nineteenth century legal scholars and 
adopted in one of the most influential nineteenth century constitutional treatises? We can only speculate. 
One possibility: Lieber assumed that in some nontrivial number of cases there was “one true meaning” 
that could be discovered by judges through objective interpretation. See id. at 108. This view was 
subjected to devastating criticism in the early twentieth century by the realists. See, e.g., K.N. 
Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–40 (1934) (arguing that judges 
read their own values into the texts they interpret). If that criticism is valid, there is no need to 
distinguish between interpretation and construction—all judicial decisionmaking takes place within the 
construction zone. We suspect that the realists found their indeterminacy in the construction zone and 
then attributed it to interpretation as well, but we have not examined their examples to establish this. We 
suspect further that the object of this move was to escape the constraints imposed by the letter of the text 
as part of their campaign against “formalism” in favor of doing “substantive justice.” Collapsing the 
distinction helps advance this objective. 
44. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION, (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1868). 
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which the author intended to convey.”45 Construction, on the other hand, “is the 
drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions 
of the text, from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which 
are in the spirit, though not in the letter of the text.”46 
In addition to Lieber, Cooley relied on Bouvier’s Law Dictionary: 
Bouvier defines the two terms succinctly as follows: “Interpretation, the dis-
covery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey 
ideas.” “Construction, in practice, determining the meaning and application as 
to the case in question of the provisions of a constitution, statute, will, or other 
instrument, or of an oral agreement.”47 
According to Cooley, the need for construction arises from a number of 
sources. 
The deficiencies of human language are such that if written instruments were 
always carefully drawn, and by persons skilled in the use of words, we should 
not be surprised to find their meaning often drawn in question, or at least to 
meet with difficulties in their practical application. But these difficulties are 
greatly increased when draughtsmen are careless or incompetent, and they 
multiply rapidly when the instruments are to be applied, not only to the sub-
jects directly within the contemplation of those who framed them, but also to a 
great variety of new circumstances which could not have been anticipated, but 
which must nevertheless be governed by the general rules which the instru-
ments establish. So, also, the different stand-points which diverse interests 
occupy incline men to take different views of the instruments which affect 
those interests; and from all these considerations the subject of construction is 
always prominent in the practical administration of the law.48 
The interpretation–construction distinction was subsequently refined by contracts 
scholars, including Arthur Corbin, Edwin Patterson, and Allen Farnsworth.49 
Corbin went beyond Lieber to maintain that any judicial activity which did not 
involve ascertaining the meaning of expressions or determining that a contract 
existed was not part of interpretation but was part of construction.50 Thus refined, 
the interpretation–construction distinction eventually made its way into the 
45. Id. at 38 n.1 (quoting LIEBER, supra note 1, at 11). 
46. Id. (emphasis added). 
47. Id. at 39 (quoting JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
(edition unknown)). 
48. Id. at 38. 
49. See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 532–35 (1960 & Supp. 1980); E. 
Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967); Edwin W. Patterson, 
The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964). 
50. For a discussion of the differences between Lieber’s and Corbin’s approaches, see Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract Default Rules: An Essay on Lieber and Corbin, 16 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2225 (1995). 
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Restatement of Contracts and continues to play a role in contracts scholarship and 
in guiding adjudication.51 
Informed by his views of popular sovereignty, Whittington initially associated 
the activity of constitutional interpretation with the judiciary and the activity of 
constitutional construction solely with the “political” branches. In 1999, one of 
us—Randy Barnett—articulated a somewhat different view. First in 1999 in An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists,52 and later in 2004 in Restoring the Lost 
Constitution,53 Barnett contended that judges too needed to engage in constitu-
tional construction when the original meaning of the text “runs out.”54 That is, 
when original meaning was insufficient to determine the outcome of a case or 
controversy, the judiciary needed to engage in constitutional construction to sup-
plement original meaning.55 
Soon thereafter, echoing Corbin, Lawrence Solum clarified that, whereas con-
stitutional interpretation was the activity of ascertaining the text’s communicative 
content, constitutional construction was the activity of giving the text legal 
effect.56 Even if the communicative content of the text is “thick” enough for a 
constitutional decision maker to determine what is required in a particular setting, 
actually using that text to make a legally effective decision is an act of construc-
tion. If the text is sufficiently thick, however, the decision maker need not enter 
what Solum has termed the “construction zone” and develop a textually unspeci-
fied rule to resolve the matter at hand.57 
The interpretation–construction distinction became the second component of a 
defensible theory of originalism. But the introduction of this distinction into orig-
inalist theory would also open a schism among originalists that persists to this 
day. 
51. See Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the “Four Corners” to 
Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 73 (1999); Solum, supra note 16, at 486–87 
(citing cases deploying the distinction). 
52. Barnett, supra note 5. 
53. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
(2004); see also Solum, supra note 7; Solum, supra note 16. 
54. See BARNETT, supra note 53, at 121–30. Whittington would soon accept this expanded vision of 
the activity of constitutional construction: 
[C]onstitutional constructions, as distinct from constitutional interpretations, must be and 
are made by political actors in and around the elected branches of government. Perhaps they 
should also be made on occasion by judges, but in doing so, judges are engaging in a political 
and creative enterprise and cannot simply rely on the authority of interpreting the founders’ 
Constitution. 
See Whittington, supra note 5, at 612. The theory presented here takes issue with the claim that 
construction is necessarily “political.” See BARNETT, supra note 53, at 122–24 (rejecting the claim that 
construction is inherently political). 
55. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 (2011). 
56. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 
488 (2013). 
57. Solum, supra note 16, at 458. Put still another way, whereas giving legal effect to any 
constitutional text requires constitutional construction, only when giving effect to underdeterminate text 
need one enter into the construction zone and adopt a textually unspecified rule of decision. 
2018] THE LETTER & THE SPIRIT 13 
D. THE SCHISM AMONG ORIGINALISTS 
As explicated by Whittington, Barnett, and Solum, the interpretation– 
construction distinction had a seemingly logical entailment. Because only 
constitutional interpretation was concerned with ascertaining the original com-
municative content of constitutional text, only interpretation could be originalist. 
Construction was not and could not be originalist: 
According to the distinction between interpretation and construction, then, 
originalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that identifies the 
meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of its enactment. The text 
of the Constitution may say a lot, but it does not say everything one needs to 
know to resolve all possible cases and controversies. Originalism is not a 
theory of what to do when original meaning runs out.58 
Furthermore, whereas ascertaining the original communicative content of the 
text was an empirical inquiry into linguistic meaning, constitutional construction 
seemingly had little or no such empirical constraint. Therefore, the constraining 
“rule of law” benefits of originalism—indeed, of a written constitution—did not 
seem to carry over to constitutional construction. To the extent a clause was irre-
ducibly ambiguous or vague, judges (and other constitutional decisionmakers) 
seemed to regain the relatively open-ended discretion that characterizes living 
constitutionalism, thereby undermining a rule-of-law commitment that unites all 
originalists. 
Those concerned that the interpretation–construction distinction gives judges 
too much discretion have criticized the distinction in primarily two ways. First, 
some critics have simply denied the distinction exists. This was the tack taken by 
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner in their 2012 book Reading Law. In that volume, 
Scalia and Garner contended that the interpretation–construction distinction was 
based on a linguistic misunderstanding. “[T]he noun construction answers both 
to construe (meaning ‘to interpret’) and to construct (meaning ‘to build’),” the 
authors explained, and “nontextualists have latched onto [this] duality of con-
struction.”59 But, they averred, “this supposed distinction between interpretation 
and construction has never reflected the courts’ actual usage”—in legal practice, 
the terms are synonymous.60 Thus, “[f]rom the germ of an idea in the theoretical 
works of . . . Francis Lieber,” they argued, has been “born, out of false linguistic 
association, a whole new field of legal inquiry.”61 
As it happens, Cooley in the first edition of “Constitutional Limitations” 
included a footnote that anticipated this criticism: 
58. Barnett, supra note 55, at 69 (emphasis added). 
59. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
13 (2012). 
60. Id. at 15. For a response to Scalia and Garner, see Solum, supra note 16, at 483–88. 
61. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 59, at 13–14. 
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In what we shall say in this chapter, the word construction will be employed in 
a sense embracing all that is covered by the two words interpretation and con-
struction when used in their strictly accurate and technical sense. Their mean-
ing is not the same, though they are frequently used as expressing the same 
idea.62 
Justice Cooley was right and Justice Scalia was wrong. Regardless of the labels 
used, ascertaining the communicative content of a text is a different activity than 
giving legal effect to that meaning. Although it is not interpretation, constitu-
tional construction—call it implementation if you like—is unavoidable.  
Indeed, it is because he lacked the interpretation–construction distinction in his 
toolkit that Justice Scalia took an unfortunate turn in his otherwise methodologi-
cally rigorous originalist opinion for the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller.63 
As we will explain in Part IV, had he accepted the distinction, Justice Scalia 
would have been equipped to explain why textually unspecified doctrines were 
needed to apply the original meaning of “the right to keep and bear arms” to par-
ticular types of firearms, such as machine guns, or to particular persons, such as 
convicted felons.64 As it was, machine guns and convicted felons were presented 
as ad hoc exceptions to the Second Amendment right without any explanation at 
all.65 
The second main criticism aimed at the interpretation–construction distinction 
is by those who accept the distinction in principle, but deny that it has much, if 
any, practical application. If construction begins only when original meaning 
ends, then the thicker the communicative content of the text, the less need there is 
to enter into the construction zone at all.66 Conversely, if original meaning is thin, 
the construction zone is vast and virtually all litigated constitutional cases may 
require recourse to textually unspecified rules of decision. Although Solum and 
Barnett have explained that the communicative content of the Constitution is 
much thicker than its bare semantic meaning,67 others have maintained that the 
Constitution’s text is thick enough to eliminate the construction zone altogether. 
Gary Lawson and Michael Paulsen have contended that interpretive presump-
tions which guide decisionmaking in the face of evidentiary uncertainty are a part 
of the text’s original meaning.68 John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have 
sought to thicken original meaning in two different ways. First, by contending 
62. COOLEY, supra note 44, at 38 n.1 (fourth emphasis added). 
63. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
64. Id. at 626–27. 
65. For a critique of the ad hoc nature of this paragraph, see Lund, supra note 10.  
66. This would still be construction, but it is not the kind of construction that those who are 
concerned about the interpretation–construction distinction are really worried about—their worry is 
about the construction zone and the discretion that it seems to afford decision makers. See supra note 10. 
67. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 288–91 (2017) 
(discussing contextual enrichment of the sparse semantic content of the constitutional text). 
68. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2012); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 
859 (2009). 
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that the “original methods” of judicial decisionmaking are a part of the text’s 
original meaning.69 Second, by claiming that the Constitution is written in what 
they call “the language of the law,” which is thicker than the meaning that would 
be known to the general public.70 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law 24 
(Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 17-262, 2017), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928936 [https://perma.cc/BC4Q-ZLME]. 
We can appreciate the concerns about judicial discretion that have been raised 
regarding the construction zone. If, as originalism critic Thomas Colby has put it, 
the original meaning of the Constitution is “sufficiently open-ended as to be inca-
pable of resolving most concrete cases,” and if there will be “multiple rules of 
decision that are each consistent with the original meaning of the vague or ambig-
uous constitutional command,” judges embarking upon a construction project 
might seem to be adrift in an ocean of discretion.71 Loosely bounded judicial dis-
cretion ought to be deeply troubling to anyone who values the rule of law. 
Further, it is of little practical benefit to judges to be told that they are free 
(within the boundaries set by thin semantic meaning) to articulate whatever rules 
of decision they deem to be consistent with their preferred normative theories. 
Judges do not have the time to consider how they might make the Constitution 
“the best it can be,” so long as they stay within the bounds of a capacious norma-
tive framework, and they have lots of other things to think about that do not 
involve moral or political philosophy.72 
A growing body of research supports the proposition that judges (like the rest 
of us) rely upon heuristics: mental shortcuts that simplify decisionmaking.73 
Heuristics are not necessarily good or bad. Heuristics that are well-adapted to a 
given decisionmaking environment can better position decisionmakers to make 
accurate judgments than can more complex and effortful strategies. But maladap-
tive heuristics can produce systematic errors. 
One way to safeguard against such errors is to provide judges with the tools to 
develop well-adapted heuristics. Thus, originalists who insist that entrance into 
the construction zone will inevitably occur in a nontrivial number of cases can 
address the concern that recognition of the interpretation–construction distinction 
69. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 751. 
70. 
71. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 732 (2011). 
72. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 248 (1986). The preeminent “moral reading” theorist 
today is James Fleming. JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL 
READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISM (2015). 
73. The most influential article on heuristics in cognition was written by Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman. See Amos Tverskey & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). For a variety of perspectives on the use of heuristics in legal 
settings, see generally HEURISTICS IN THE LAW (Gerd Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006). For 
evidence that judges rely on heuristic reasoning, see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, 
How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in 
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Bankruptcy 
Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 777 (2001). 
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exposes the citizenry to arbitrary judicial power, by developing and providing to 
judges a manageable and reliable methodology for disciplining constitutional 
construction. That is the goal of our project. 
We agree that, because the original meaning of the text is broader than what 
bare semantic analysis yields, the construction zone is narrower than is some-
times thought. Modern originalist scholarship has revealed that many of the sup-
posedly abstract and open-ended provisions of the Constitution have more 
definite and restricted meaning when contextually enriched. But because we con-
tinue to maintain that some decisionmaking within the construction zone is inevi-
table,74 we approach this problem from the opposite direction by presenting a 
theory of constitutional construction that is constraining. 
Terminologically, because we contend that this constraining approach to con-
struction is “originalist,” we are proposing that the label “originalist” can accu-
rately be applied both to the activity of ascertaining the communicative content 
of the text and to the activity of giving legal effect to or implementing that 
meaning. 
As a matter of lexicography, the use of the word “originalism” to describe an 
approach to construction that is concerned with original functions or purposes is 
entirely consistent with usage. Starting with Brest, the word “originalism” has 
been used to describe an approach that looks to the purposes, goals, and intentions 
of the Framers and Ratifiers. At a deeper level, the conceptual structure of origi-
nalism has always been concerned with origins: our approach focuses on the 
functions present at the time each constitutional provision was enacted. We reject 
the idea that the construction of any given constitutional provision should be 
guided by functions that were not present at the time of enactment, although cer-
tainly subsequent amendments can add new functions to the constitutional text.75 
Our approach is based on the first principles of the Constitution itself and was 
hinted at in Barnett’s early explication of constitutional construction: 
74. See Solum, supra note 16, at 499–524 (discussing the ineliminability of the construction zone). 
75. Can subsequent amendments alter the original spirit of previously-enacted provisions? Imagine 
the following amendment: 
Henceforth, the First Amendment should be construed in a way that promotes equal partici-
pation in the political process, even if that means restricting campaign spending in ways that 
the Supreme Court wrongly held to violate the First Amendment in Citizens United v. FEC. 
Under our approach, judges would be obliged to honor both the letter and spirit of this amendment, 
which does not repeal the First Amendment but is designed to change how it is construed. But this is an 
easy case. What about, say, the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment alters the spirit of the 
Fifth Amendment, or whether the Nineteenth Amendment alters the spirit of the Fourteenth? 
As Ryan Williams has put it, in cases where “the competing understandings of the two generations of 
Ratifiers [can]not be honored simultaneously, there [is] a fairly strong argument that the meaning of the 
later-enacted provision should control.” Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process 
Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 505 (2010). If the letter of the First Amendment can be repealed entirely by 
a subsequent amendment tailored to that end—and we have no reason to doubt that it can—surely its 
construction can be altered as well. But it’s not clear why the original spirit of a subsequently enacted 
amendment should affect the construction of a previously enacted one absent affirmative evidence that it 
was designed to affect it. 
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If the original meaning is too vague to provide a resolution of the case or con-
troversy at issue, then (step 2) Choose a construction that yields a specific 
enough rule or doctrine to reach a unique resolution of the case at hand and 
future cases without violating the meaning ascertained in step 1. I would fur-
ther contend that when construction is needed, adopt one that (a) is consistent 
with the original meaning of the terms at issue and yet (b) furthers the constitu-
tional principles of, for example, separation of powers and federalism, and 
enhances the legitimacy of the lawmaking process.76 
The approach we present here elaborates on step 2(b). It does so by adopting 
an approach similar to that of Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman (and by Robert 
Natelson before them), who have described what they call “the Fiduciary 
Constitution.”77 
II. FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT AND JUDICIAL DUTY 
To borrow James Iredell’s memorable description at the North Carolina 
ratifying convention, the American Constitution is “a great power of attor-
ney.”78 It bears the marks of a particular kind of legal document—one that 
creates a particular kind of relationship between “We the People” and their 
agents in government, who wield delegated powers on their behalf of their 
principals. Judges are no exception to a general principle that is central to 
understanding the Constitution’s structure and content: the principle of fidu-
ciary government. 
A. CONSTITUTING A FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 
Private fiduciary relationships79 are created when one person (the fiduciary) is 
entrusted with control or management of the assets or legal interests of another 
76. BARNETT, supra note 53, at 128 (emphasis added). A similar suggestion was made by Lawrence 
Solum in response to Justice Scalia and Garner: 
Scalia and Garner might allow for judicial decision in the construction zone that honors the 
Constraint Principle and resolves vagueness and irreducible ambiguity in ways that serve the 
purposes of particular constitutional provisions and the overall constitutional structure: of 
course, Scalia and Garner would limit the purposes to those fairly derived from text and his-
tory, and would exclude purposes warranted only by the moral and political beliefs of 
judges. 
Solum, supra note 16, at 488 (emphases added). 
77. See infra Part II. 
78. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 148 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (statement of 
Att’y Gen. Iredell) (“[T]his Constitution, where the people expressly declare how much power they do 
give, and consequently retain all they do not . . . is a declaration of particular powers by the people to 
their representatives, for particular purposes. It may be considered as a great power of attorney, under 
which no power can be exercised but what is expressly given.”); see also GARY LAWSON & GUY 
SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 3 (2017) 
(discussing Iredell’s claim). 
79. See generally LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW (2005); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF 
FIDUCIARIES (1981); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
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(the beneficiary) to promote the beneficiary’s interests.80 One side of this relation-
ship is characterized by the discretionary power that is placed in the hands of the 
fiduciary; the other side is characterized by the dependency and vulnerability of 
the beneficiary to injury from opportunistic behavior by the fiduciary.81 
To prevent opportunism,82 the law imposes a set of rules83 on fiduciaries. 
These rules include the duty to follow the beneficiary’s instructions; the duty to 
take reasonable care and competently pursue the beneficiary’s interests; the duty 
of loyalty, which includes a duty to act in good faith—that is, to honestly pursue 
the beneficiary’s interests consistently with the original purposes of the entrust-
ment; if there are a multiple beneficiaries, the duty of impartiality in considering 
and balancing their interests; and the duty to account to the beneficiary.84 
Americans at the Founding understood the relationship between “government 
and governed” in fiduciary terms, influenced in this regard by their favorite politi-
cal theorists. John Locke, whose influence upon Founding-era political philoso-
phy has been widely noted, presented government officials as fiduciaries who 
wielded powers delegated to them by the people “with this trust, that they shall be 
govern’d by declared Laws” and referred to legislative power as a “fiduciary 
power to act for certain ends.”85 In their popular and highly influential series of 
essays, “Cato’s Letters,” published in the early 1720s, John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon described government as a “trust, which ought to be bounded 
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 
20 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962); J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 
LAW Q. REV. 51 (1981); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975). 
80. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 78, at 13–27 (discussing the private law fiduciary 
background of the Founding era); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235 
(2011) (discussing contemporary fiduciary theory). 
81. By “opportunistic,” we mean “self-interest seeking with guile,” to borrow Oliver Williamson’s 
widely-accepted definition. OLIVER W. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985). 
Common fiduciary relationships include a trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent and 
principal, executor and deceased’s estate, corporate officers and directors and shareholders, and partners 
in a partnership. Although these relationships are different in important respects, all of them involve a 
separation between the ownership and management or control of assets or legal interests; vulnerability 
to opportunism arising from that separation; and consequently high agency costs. 
82. In economic terms, the fiduciary’s control over the beneficiary’s resources creates agency costs 
that cannot as a practical matter be eliminated through elaborate agreements ex ante or by continuous ex 
post monitoring by the beneficiary. Agency costs can be understood as “the costs of opportunism and the 
costs of controlling opportunism.” Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 397 n.12 (2007). Fiduciary duties are designed to reduce those costs by aligning 
the incentives of the fiduciary with those of the beneficiary. 
83. Although some fiduciary duties can be contractually overridden, others cannot—of particular 
importance for our purposes, a principal cannot authorize an agent to act in bad faith. See, e.g., UNIF. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N LAWS 2006); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2007); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.06(1)(a)(i), (2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
84. See Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare 
Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 255–62 (2007). 
85. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 136, 149 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1965) (1690). 
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with many and strong restraints” and stated that “[e]very violation . . . where such 
violation is considerable, ought to meet with proportionable punishment.”86 
Baron de Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws, repeatedly cited by Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists alike, stated that citizens “entrusted” with public employ-
ment ought “to live, to act, and to think” for the sake of their fellow citizens 
alone.87 References to government officials as servants, agents, guardians, and 
trustees abound in Founding-era literature and in public debates over the 
Constitution.88 It is therefore unsurprising that, as Gary Lawson, Robert 
Natelson, and Guy Seidman have demonstrated, the Constitution was designed 
to establish a government “whose conduct would mimic that of the private-law 
fiduciary.”89 
The Constitution’s structure and content disclose its character as a fiduciary 
instrument. Like other eighteenth-century fiduciary documents, it begins with a 
preamble that states the purposes of the trust being established.90 It then delegates 
power to federal actors and institutions, as if to fiduciaries of “We the People.”91 
The Constitution refers to “public Trust”92 and to public offices “of trust”;93 
Congress is empowered to enact measures that are “necessary and proper” for 
carrying delegated powers into execution,94 and to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts, and Excises” to “provide for the . . . “general Welfare”;95 and the 
President is required to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”96   
86. 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 267 (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty 
Fund 1995) (1720). 
87. Charles De Secondat, Baron De Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD: MONTESQUIEU/ROUSSEAU 1, 31 (Thomas Nugent trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 
1952) (1748). 
88. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 63 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001) (in a republic, the people “assemble and administer [their government] by their 
representatives and agents”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra, at 243 (James Madison) (referring to 
government officials as “agents and trustees of the people”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra, at 310 
(Alexander Hamilton) (emphasizing “guardianship” and “trust”); Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 
10, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 286, 289 (Herbert Storing ed., 2008) (calling 
legislators “agents” and “representatives”). 
89. Gary Lawson et al., The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 
415, 418 (2014); see also GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 
68–70 (2010); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the 
Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (2017); Robert G. Natelson, 
The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1086 (2004); Robert G. Natelson, The 
Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 
191, 193 (2001). 
90. ROBERT G. NATELSON, THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION: WHAT IT ACTUALLY SAID AND MEANT 27– 
28 (2010). 
91. Lawson et al., supra note 89, at 415. 
92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Office of Trust”). 
94. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
95. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
96. Id. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
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This organization and language sounds in eighteenth-century fiduciary law.97 
Writes Natelson, it reveals a “purpose[] . . . to erect a government in which public 
officials would be bound by fiduciary duties to honor the law, exercise reasonable 
care, remain loyal to the public interest, exercise their power in a reasonably 
impartial fashion, and account for violations of these duties.”98 
What does all this entail for the judiciary? 
B. JUDGES AS FIDUCIARIES 
There are compelling reasons to believe that the Founding generation regarded 
judges as subject to fiduciary norms. Founding-era writings presented judges as 
representatives of the people no less than legislators. Thus, Alexander Hamilton 
in Federalist 78 argued that judges are obliged to prefer the “intention of the peo-
ple to the intention of their agents” in the legislature when those intentions con-
flicted.99 Shortly after the Constitution was ratified, a number of judges were 
impeached for violating fiduciary principles. For example, when Judge John 
Pickering was impeached in 1803, he was charged with acting “contrary to his 
trust.”100 
Lawson, Natelson, and Seidman contend that judges were understood by 
the ratifying public to be fiduciaries. But we also believe that the fiduciary 
model is normatively persuasive—that it captures the proper relationship 
between federal judges and the public today. As we will discuss, judges receive 
considerable discretionary power through a formal process that entails, among 
other things, a specific agreement to “support this Constitution.” Because we 
are all vulnerable to judicial decisions that bring the government’s coercive 
power to bear upon us, or that prevent the government’s power from being 
used to our benefit, federal judges ought to be understood as fiduciaries, with  
97. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 78, at 7–13; Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 52–53 
(2010); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original 
Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 50 (2003). 
98. Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1178 (2004). 
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 88, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton). 
100. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 319–22 (1804). Pickering suffered from both alcoholism and insanity. See 
EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT 91–100 (1999). The first article of impeachment charged that the judge, 
“with intent to evade” the law, ordered a seized ship and two cables returned to “a certain Eliphalet 
Ladd, who claimed the same” without a prior appraisal and certificates from customs officers. 8 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 320 (1804). The second article charged that Pickering, “with intent to defeat the just claims of 
the United States,” refused to hear the district attorney’s witnesses and ordered the restoration of the ship 
and cables to Ladd. Id. at 321. Article three accused the judge of “wickedly meaning and intending to 
injure the revenues of the United States” by refusing the district attorney’s appeal to the circuit court. Id. 
at 322. The fourth article described Pickering as being intoxicated at the trial and stated that “being a 
man of loose morals and intemperate habits” he lacked “essential qualities in the character of a judge.” 
Id.; see also H. LOWELL BROWN, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 
130–34 (2010). Although we take no position on the merits of the impeachment, we find it instructive 
that three of the charges sound in bad faith. 
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corresponding duties.101 
In constitutional interpretation and construction, the most relevant fiduciary 
duties are the duties to follow instructions and to act in good faith. Judges not 
only draw their power from Article III of the Constitution but are also required 
by Article VI to take an oath to “support this Constitution.”102 Guiding their 
conduct by “this Constitution” entails following the instructions given to them 
in the provisions of the Constitution that authorize and delimit their power. 
Article III’s text is sparse but thick with meaning. As Philip Hamburger has 
shown, the authorization of the “[t]he judicial power” incorporates a concept 
of the judicial office that was sufficiently understood during the Founding era 
as to render it unnecessary to spell out in great detail.103 At its core, judging 
was an office of independent judgment, undistorted by will.104 Judges were to 
decide cases before them in conformance with the law of the land, and not 
instantiate extralegal preferences.105 Judges’ convictions concerning the law’s 
justice could not overcome their duty to give effect to the law where its mean-
ing was clear.106 
In the early American republic, the duty of independent judgment had counter-
majoritarian implications. The principal threats to liberty in eighteenth-century 
America came from state legislatures and popular majorities that, as Hamburger 
explains, “repeatedly threatened the freedom of various racial, religious, political, 
and propertied minorities.”107 American judges came to be regarded as essential 
to the maintenance of the rule of law and the protection of individual rights. For 
that reason, the 1788 Constitution provided for a structurally independent federal 
judiciary—staffed by judges who would serve only during “good Behaviour,” 
and who would enjoy undiminished salaries (an attempt to forestall pecuniary 
threats to their independent judgment)108—whose purpose was, in Alexander  
101. The scholar who has made the most of the oath in recent years is Richard Re, whose work we 
discuss infra notes 114–18. 
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 
103. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 148 (2008). 
104. Id. 
105. See id. at 148–59 (discussing need to resist influence of Crown officials seeking deference to 
executive power—externally imposed will); id. at 173–78 (discussing need to resist influence of own 
political inclinations—internal will). 
106. Id. at 55 (explaining that “judges at least by the sixteenth century came to recognize that they 
could pursue charitable suppositions about a statute’s intent only when its intent was otherwise 
unclear”). 
107. Id. at 324. See also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION (2016) (documenting the Framers’ “deep distrust of the people” and arguing that 
“nearly every substantive choice made in the Constitution” was informed by that distrust); GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 409 (2d ed. 1998) (detailing how in 
the 1780s “Americans’ inveterate suspicion and jealousy of political power, once concentrated almost 
exclusively on the Crown and its agents, was transferred to the various state legislatures,” which had 
become “the institutions to be most feared”). 
108. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1. 
22 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:1 
Hamilton’s words, to “guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals.”109 
Article III assures individuals who are confronted with assertions of government 
power, which they believe to be unlawful, that they need not resort to revolution 
to vindicate the rights that could be threatened by local legislatures no less than 
by a distant monarch. 
C. THE EXPRESS PROMISE OF EACH AND EVERY JUDGE 
In general, fiduciary relationships are voluntary—at least on the part of the fi-
duciary.110 As Gregory Klass has put it, “[O]ne does not become a trustee, an 
executor, a guardian, a corporate director, a joint venturer, an agent, an attorney, 
a teacher or a priest by accident.”111 
Although we maintain that it is a fiction to claim that each and every person 
subject to the jurisdiction of a government “tacitly” consents to that jurisdic-
tion,112 each and every judge expressly consents to be bound by “this 
Constitution.” In this way, the fiduciary relationship between federal judges 
and the rest of us arises through a formal promise. As Judge Frank Easterbrook 
has described it: “Like other judges, I took an oath to support and enforce both 
the laws and the Constitution. That is to say, I made a promise—a contract. In 
exchange for receiving power and lifetime tenure I agreed to limit the extent of 
my discretion.”113 
What is the content of that judicial promise? Article VI declares that “[t]his 
Constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land” and that “judicial officers, 
both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affir-
mation to support this Constitution.” This same Constitution that is the “supreme 
law of the land” is the Constitution that “judicial officers” are bound by law and 
in conscience to support. 
109. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 88, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamburger cautions 
against projecting such functional considerations into the minds of judges deciding cases. See 
HAMBURGER, supra note 103, at 610 (“[J]udges ordinarily assumed that they served the functions of 
enforcing the constitution and protecting liberty by doing their duty—by deciding in accord with the law 
of the land . . . .”). But “[i]t was understood that in doing their duty, the judges served broader 
constitutional functions.” Id. at 323. 
110. Certain fiduciary relationships do not require the beneficiary’s consent—they are established 
through unilateral undertaking by the fiduciary. See Miller, supra note 80, at 253 (offering the guardian– 
ward relationship as an example). 
111. Gregory Klass, What if Fiduciary Duties Are Like Contractual Ones?, in CONTRACT, STATUS, 
AND FIDUCIARY LAW 101 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016). 
112. See BARNETT, supra note 53, at 10–31 (critiquing claims for government authority based on 
“tacit consent”). But see RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: RESTORING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 73–78 (2017) (explaining the proper role of “presumed 
consent” in setting the boundaries of discretionary legislative power). 
113. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1122 
(1998). Because one of us denies that contract law is based on “promise,” we doubt that the formal 
promise of the oath constitutes a “contract” strictly speaking. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not 
Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 649–50 (2012). But we nevertheless insist 
that the judicial promise establishes a real and voluntary fiduciary relationship that is legally and 
morally binding. 
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We emphasize “in conscience.” Richard Re has observed that “[n]o hand— 
either dead or alive—forces individuals to run for office, take the oath, or lead 
others to think that they will take ‘the Constitution’ seriously.”114 Once officials 
do make such a promise, however, they are entrusted with power that they would 
not otherwise possess, a power that has moral implications. 
Although a mere document cannot create binding moral obligations simply by 
virtue of its existence, officials entrusted with power over other people by virtue 
of a voluntary promise to adhere to the terms of that document are morally and 
legally bound to keep that promise.115 As Re has written, the oath “functions as a 
bridge between the document and the duty to obey it.”116 More specifically, an 
oath to support the Constitution creates a morally binding promise “to adopt an 
interpretive theory tethered to the Constitution’s text and history.”117 Were judges 
free to interpret the Constitution however they saw fit, in the service of whatever 
ends they deemed desirable, the oath would have little significance. 
114. Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 313 (2016); see also 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 239 (2d ed. 2009) (“[A]n oath may impose a moral obligation to 
obey (e.g. when voluntarily undertaken prior to assuming an office of state which one is under no 
compulsion or great pressure to assume).”); STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE 
MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009) (“Oaths are not taken alone. . . . They are said aloud, 
in a manner that ensures at least the appearance of being voluntary. The oath represents an assurance 
that invites reliance upon those subject to the official’s authority.”). 
115. Or what? How can “We the Principals” hold public officials to their fiduciary obligations? 
Unfaithful agents in the political branches may be removable during the next election cycle—what of 
judges, who enjoy life tenure during good behavior and who can be removed only with great difficulty, 
even if they consistently engage in bad behavior? 
No response to this agency problem is likely to entirely satisfy. Our modest submission is that judges 
care about their reputations, and that providing their audiences with frameworks to evaluate their 
performance can increase the benefits of adopting those frameworks and the costs of deviating from 
those frameworks. For an exploration of how judicial desire for approval from salient personal 
audiences can affect judicial performance, see generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR 
AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). 
116. Re, supra note 114, at 308; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 
U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 778 (1990) (“Judges may not derive the power to coerce others from the 
existence of legal rules and then say: ‘Now that I have the power, I needn’t follow the rules.’ Rules are 
the source of the power being asserted.”). 
117. Re, supra note 114, at 323–24. We agree with Re that the oath creates a morally binding 
promise. However, we depart from his contention that officials have a promissory obligation to adhere to 
the public’s understanding of “the Constitution” at the time they take their oaths. Id. at 304. As 
Christopher Green has shown, indexical language—language whose reference shifts from context to 
context, like “this,” “now,” “here” and “that”—throughout the Constitution points toward a historical 
document. Thus, the oath taker’s authority under “this Constitution” is contingent upon fidelity to that 
document. See Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for 
Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1612 (2009). For similar arguments, see 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 33 (2000) (“With these 
words [in the Supremacy Clause], the Constitution crowns itself king; judges and other officials must 
pledge allegiance to the document.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules 
for its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 869 (2008) (“‘[T]his Constitution,’ means, each 
time it is invoked . . . the entire text of the written Constitution . . . the document specifies the document 
as authoritative.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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The current text of the oath required of all federal officers makes explicit that 
the elevation of federal office triggers a duty to perform one’s constitutional 
duties in good faith: 
I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; 
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation 
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will 
well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to 
enter. So help me God.118 
The current text of the federal judicial oath also makes explicit the duty of 
good faith on the part of the judges and Justices. 
I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without 
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will 
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon 
me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me 
God.119 
To say, however, that judges are fiduciaries who are duty-bound to exercise in-
dependent judgment and faithfully follow their constitutional instructions pro-
vides little guidance concerning (a) how judges are to interpret the Constitution, 
or (b) what they are to do in cases where they are unable to arrive at one determi-
nate answer to a particular legal question solely by relying on the communicative 
content of the text. After all, even the Constitution’s defenders have acknowl-
edged the inherent imprecision in language and the impossibility of providing for 
every contingency in a written text.120 
Originalists have a ready answer to the first question: judges are to ascertain 
the fixed communicative content of the Constitution’s text. Originalists have yet 
to unify behind a framework for addressing the second question.121 We look to 
contract law—which, like fiduciary law, imposes a duty of good faith on power- 
exercising parties—for guidance here. Just as the predominant originalist 
approach to interpretation—original public meaning122—closely resembles con-
tract law’s “objective theory of assent” as determined at the time of a contract’s 
118. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (emphasis added). 
119. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (emphasis added). 
120. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 88, at 183 (James Madison). 
121. Which is not to say that no one has theorized about the construction zone before. Jack Balkin 
identified eleven different kinds of arguments that have been invoked to guide construction. Jack Balkin, 
The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 655 (2013). Balkin’s analysis 
is primarily descriptive rather than normative, however, and he does not provide a framework for 
evaluating particular constructions. 
122. See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 
123 (2013) (noting that public meaning originalism is “the predominant originalist theory”). 
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formation,123 we believe the proper approach to constitutional construction 
resembles the contractual duty of good-faith performance. 
III. THE JUDICIAL DUTY OF GOOD-FAITH PERFORMANCE 
In Part II, we explained why judges who voluntarily assume public office 
through an express oath to support “this Constitution”124 thereby become fiducia-
ries who expressly bind themselves morally and legally to ascertain and “faith-
fully” give effect to the Constitution’s original meaning. But how are judges to 
follow their constitutional instructions when the communicative content of the 
Constitution’s text does not yield a single determinate answer, and they must 
exercise (textually bounded) discretion? 
The same issue arises in contract law, when contractual text delegates discre-
tionary powers to one of the parties—as they often do. How is this discretionary 
power to be exercised? In particular, how are ordinary contracting parties to be 
protected from the opportunistic abuses of such discretionary powers? Contract 
law has answered these questions by recognizing the duty of good-faith perform-
ance. This doctrine bars parties from using the discretion accorded them under 
the letter (the text) of the agreement to defeat the spirit (the original purpose) of 
the agreement. 
In what follows, we will consider how a model of good-faith contractual per-
formance illuminates the way judges ought to exercise their own discretionary 
power. 
A. THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF GOOD-FAITH PERFORMANCE: THE FOREGONE 
OPPORTUNITIES THEORY 
The duty to perform contracts in good faith has long been recognized as a 
general principle of contract law.125 Section 1-304 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code—adopted, with only minor variations, in forty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia to govern the sale of goods—stipulates that “[e]very contract or 
duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith  
123. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CONTRACTS 68–74 (2010) 
(describing and explaining the rationale for the objective theory of assent). 
124. Does it matter that the current form of the Article VI oath refers to “the Constitution” rather than 
“this Constitution”? It does not. If the current oath did not have the same referent as the text of Article 
VI—say, if it denoted “the understanding of the Constitution presently held by the oath-taker”—the 
current form of the oath would be constitutionally problematic, as it would facilitate an end-around the 
promise that the Constitution requires as a condition of deriving power from it. But there is no reason to 
think that the current oath has a different referent or that it is so understood by oath-takers. See Green, 
supra note 117, at 1645 n.120 (chronicling statements by officials spanning more than two centuries, all 
of which equate the oath “with the requirement of Article VI and the historic Constitution”). 
125. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669–70 (1963) (tracing the duty of good-faith 
performance back to Roman law). 
26 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:1 
in its performance and enforcement.”126 Because it is implicit in every contract, 
the duty of good-faith performance cannot be waived (though the scope of per-
formance can be more precisely defined in the contract).127 Importantly, as the 
Official Comment explains, “the doctrine of good faith merely directs a court 
towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they are 
created, performed, and enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness 
and reasonableness which can be independently breached.”128 
The duty of good-faith performance of a contract rests upon factual premises 
that are easily appreciated: people are not omniscient, they do not have endless 
time, they could not make agreements that provide for every contingency even if 
they desired to do so, and they would be discouraged from making agreements at 
all if they had to worry about every exercise of discretion being used to defeat the 
purposes for which they entered into agreements in the first place.129 Moreover, 
parties often contract to receive the benefit of specialized knowledge and judg-
ment that they themselves lack.130 By necessity, that specialized knowledge must 
be drawn upon, and that judgment must be exercised at the discretion of the other 
party. 
The duty of good-faith performance is a “gap-filling” doctrine that is calculated 
to preserve people’s reasonable expectations in receiving the performance of the 
other party and the benefit of their bargains. The doctrine operates to thwart exer-
cises of discretion that violate those reasonable expectations, even if that behavior 
does not breach any express contractual terms.131 That is, it operates to thwart 
opportunism—to prevent parties, as economist Oliver Williamson once put it, 
from “tak[ing] advantage of . . . the letter of the contract when the spirit of the 
exchange is emasculated.”132 
Though entrenched in our law, the duty of good-faith performance has at times 
been bedeviled by uncertain formulations.133 To render the concept more precise, 
126. U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016). 
127. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2008) (“[T]he obligations of good 
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but 
the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is 
to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”). 
128. U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016). 
129. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 821, 821–22 (1992). 
130. Id. at 892. 
131. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1223, 1256 (1999) (“[A] core function of the duty of good faith lies in imposing limitations on a 
party’s exercise of a discretionary power to control an aspect of a contractual relationship after 
formation.”). 
132. WILLIAMSON, supra note 81, at 62. 
133. See Randy E. Barnett, The Richness of Contract Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1413–14 
(describing how contracts scholars in the 1950s and 60s rejected “[a]ny effort to reduce the vast 
complexity of the real world of commercial practice to some verbal formula” and focusing in particular 
on the influential work of Robert Summers, who proposed a series of six categories of bad-faith 
performance and “explicitly denied that any more general conception of good faith was helpful or even 
possible”); see also Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968). 
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in 1980, Steven Burton presented a theory of the duty of good-faith performance 
of contracts that focused on contractually-delegated discretion.134 Surveying 400 
cases in which courts expressly referred to good-faith performance, Burton con-
tended that good faith in contract law operates as a means of ensuring that parties 
do not use the discretion accorded them under the terms of a contract to “recap-
ture opportunities forgone upon contracting.”135 
According to Burton, good-faith performance “occurs when a party’s discre-
tion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of 
the parties at the time of formation—to capture opportunities that were pre-
served upon entering the contract.”136 The doctrine of good-faith performance 
thus “directs attention to the opportunities forgone by a discretion-exercising 
party at formation, and to that party’s reasons for exercising discretion during 
performance.”137 The identity of forgone opportunities is determined by 
focusing on the expectations of reasonable persons in the position of the de-
pendent parties—the expectations as to benefits to be received by the prom-
isee and expectations as to costs (foregone opportunities) to be borne by the 
promisee.138 
Under Burton’s approach, whether a particular discretion-exercising party 
acted for the purpose of recapturing foregone opportunities as objectively pro-
vided by the agreement is a question of subjective intent of the party exercising 
discretion. If a discretion-exercising party uses its control under the letter of the 
contract for the purpose of recapturing a foregone opportunity—even when the 
conduct is within the letter of the contract because the letter has granted that party 
discretion—the discretion-exercising party has acted in bad faith. Burton offered 
several illustrative examples from the case law, two of which involved contrac-
tual conditions where the satisfaction of those conditions was in the control of 
one party. 
In Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, a contract for the sale of land was condi-
tioned on the buyer’s obtaining financing.139 The buyer did not go through with 
the deal, claiming an inability to obtain financing.140 The seller sued, claiming 
that the buyer had failed to perform in good faith.141 The evidence indicated 
that the buyer had approached four banks in the hopes of obtaining financing 
but was refused because of a tight money market.142 In this case, wrote Burton, 
“The reason for the buyer’s failure was indeed the very one that induces the 
typical financing condition in land sale contracts” and thus the “buyer’s 
134. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 369, 373 (1980). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. (emphasis added). 
137. Id. (emphasis added). 
138. Id. at 387. 
139. 297 A.2d 643, 643–44 (R.I. 1972). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 645. 
142. Id. 
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discretion [in declining to accept financing at the proffered terms] . . . was exer-
cised in good faith in light of the purpose that parties normally have in mind in 
so conditioning a promise to buy land.”143 
Burton contrasted Cardi with Fry v. George Elkins Co., which involved a sale 
of a residential home that was conditioned on the buyer securing financing at a 
specified rate.144 The buyer was informed at the time of the formation of the con-
tract that he could not obtain such financing from a bank, but that it could prob-
ably be obtained from a particular mortgage company that already had a 
substantial loan on the property.145 Nonetheless, the buyer only approached banks 
and made no application or inquiry of the mortgage company.146 The evidence 
indicated that the buyer had lost all interest in the house and had decided to move 
to Hawaii147—a reason decidedly “outside the normal reasons for so conditioning 
a promise to buy a house,” and which was thus grounds for concluding that the 
buyer had subjectively “sought to recapture an opportunity foregone upon enter-
ing the contract.”148 
Although it is often difficult to determine whether a party has exercised dis-
cretion for the purpose of recapturing a forgone opportunity, Burton’s theory 
focuses judicial attention in the right place: whether discretionary power has 
been used to undercut the purpose for which discretion was given. Burton’s 
theory also provides useful methods of evaluation, assessing exercises of dis-
cretion with reference to the parties’ reasonable expectations at the time of the 
contract’s formation and evidence that one party sought to evade or defeat 
those expectations. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL DUTY: ADHERING TO THE SPIRIT OF THE TEXT 
We maintain that judges are fiduciaries, not ordinary contracting parties, and fi-
duciary relationships are not the same as ordinary contractual relationships. Yet, 
as fiduciary law scholar D. Gordon Smith, drawing upon Burton’s theory, has 
observed, the fiduciary duty of good faith and the contractual duty of good faith 
are directed at a common evil: opportunism arising from discretion and vulner-
ability. Smith explains: 
Fiduciary duty and the duty of good faith and fair dealing both exist because 
contracts are less than complete. In fiduciary relationships, discretion provides 
the fiduciary with the opportunity to expropriate value from the beneficiary; in 
contractual relationships, discretion provides one contracting party with the 
opportunity to “recapture opportunities forgone at formation.”149 
143. Burton, supra note 134, at 402 (emphasis added). 
144. 327 P.2d 905, 906 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 907. 
147. Id. at 906–07. 
148. Burton, supra note 134, at 402. 
149. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1491 (2002) (quoting Burton, supra note 134, at 387). 
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The common evil of opportunism that both the contractual and fiduciary duties 
of good faith are designed to thwart, taken together with Burton’s specific focus 
on the opportunistic abuse of discretion under the letter of contracts, suggests the 
utility of Burton’s forgone opportunities theory as a means of guiding constitu-
tional construction. 
Having said this, we stress that constitutions function as directives to gov-
ernment actors that are given on behalf of the people; constitutions are not con-
tracts.150 An assessment of whether a government action was made for the 
purpose of reclaiming an opportunity that was forgone at the time a judge or 
other constitutional actor took an oath to obey the Constitution must be 
assessed differently than we assess the good faith of a limited set of contracting 
parties. 
Where Burton’s approach to the good faith performance of contracts looks to 
evidence of the subjective intent of a party to reclaim an opportunity that was 
objectively forgone, we favor an objective approach to ascertaining the good faith 
of governmental actors. As we will explain, whether or not an action was per-
formed by a government agent in bad faith is a conclusion that results from an in-
quiry into the objectively assessed fit between the means adopted and the ends 
that are within the proper scope of a constitutional actor’s powers. If the means- 
end fit is too attenuated, we can then conclude that the action was taken for the 
purpose of achieving other ends. 
We do not favor inquiring directly into the motives of government officials 
to assess whether their actions were taken in good faith. But we should not 
blink the fact that constitutional actors often act for purposes that they fore-
went when receiving power in return for their oaths. A realistic consciousness 
of this fact justifies a degree of critical skepticism when assessing means– 
ends fit. 
Judges receive their power from the letter of a written instrument and by neces-
sity enjoy a great deal of discretion, owing to the nature of the instructions given 
them—instructions which often lack the linguistic precision to yield determinate 
answers in cases that judges are duty-bound to decide.151 That power is delegated 
to judges by the people on the basis of their specialized knowledge of the law and 
judgment in deciding cases. 
As with contractual discretion, judicial discretion can be abused. The people 
are vulnerable to opportunistic judicial behavior that can threaten their liberty, 
their property, and even their lives. Just as contracting parties can use their  
150. See BARNETT, supra note 53, at 11–32 (explaining the differences between contracts and 
constitutions). 
151. Indeed, Burton appreciated how his theory could serve as a means of guiding the exercise of 
judicial discretion, elaborating a comprehensive theory of good-faith adjudication in his 1992 book, 
Judging in Good Faith—albeit without advocating any particular theory of constitutional interpretation. 
STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992). 
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contractual discretion in bad faith to undermine the “spirit” of the contract—its 
originally understood purpose or purposes—so too can fiduciaries abuse the dis-
cretion they are delegated to violate the purposes for which the fiduciary relation-
ship was created. 
What, then, is the spirit of the Constitution? At common law and in eight-
eenth-century America, the distinction between the linguistic meaning of a 
provision of a legal instrument and that instrument’s fundamental purpose(s) 
or function(s)—whether a contract or a constitution—was expressed through a 
Christian trope: the distinction between the “letter” and the “spirit.”152 
Although the letter was ordinarily sufficient to resolve a given question, where 
the letter was obscure and judges confronted a need to choose, judges followed 
the spirit of the text. 
An instructive example: When Edmund Pendleton, then President of the 
Virginia Court of Appeals, gave his opinion in the 1782 case of Common- 
wealth v. Caton, he said that because “[t]he language of the clause [of the 
Virginia Treason Act] . . . admits of both the constructions mentioned by the at-
torney general,” the choice of constructions should be “decided according to 
the spirit.”153 Revealingly, Pendleton stated that he “prefer[red] the first, as 
most congenial to the spirit, and not inconsistent with the letter, of the 
constitution.”154 
In this respect, Pendleton, like many American judges,155 followed Sir William 
Blackstone, who wrote that “the most universal and effectual way of discovering 
the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the rea-
son and spirit of it.”156 The spirit of the law was considered to be part of the 
law.157 
152. HAMBURGER, supra note 103, at 54. 
153. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 19 (1782). 
154. Id. 
155. See Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1251–53 (2007) (noting that reliance upon the “spirit,” “sense,” 
“meaning,” or “reason” of an enactment “for purposes of documentary construction—sometimes even at 
the expense of the literal wording—reflected the norm in Anglo-American jurisprudence”). 
156. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61. 
157. Consider a much-quoted passage by Edmund Plowden, among the most highly regarded legal 
authorities in England and America and often cited by American judges: 
[I]t is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law, and our law (like 
all others) consists of two parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of the law is the body of the 
law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law, quia ratio legis est anima legis. 
[“For the reason of the law is the soul of the law.”] And the law may be resembled to a nut, 
which has a shell and a kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell, and the sense of 
it the kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you make use only of the shell, so you 
will receive no benefit by the law, if you rely only upon the letter, and as the fruit and profit of 
the nut lies in the kernel, and not in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consists in the 
sense more than in the letter. 
Eyston v. Studd (1574) 2 Plowden 459, 465, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695 (KB) (reporter’s commentary). For 
Founding-era American citations to Plowden, see Natelson, supra note 155, at 1253 n.64. 
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The distinction between letter and spirit—and recourse to the spirit (only) 
upon failure of the letter—captures an enduring truth. The Constitution’s provi-
sions, like the Constitution as a whole, are calculated to perform particular func-
tions, and they would be without value if they did not do so. Truly understanding 
and applying the text may require an understanding of those functions.158 
Lacking certainty about how to resolve a given case on the basis of the 
Constitution’s linguistic meaning alone, judges must make a decision on the 
basis of some reason. To formulate a rule with reference to the function—or 
functions—that a relevant provision is designed to perform is not a matter of 
making the law “the best it can be” but giving effect to the law as best one can. 
A judge who decided a case on the basis of a reason that cannot be grounded in 
original functions—however normatively appealing that might seem—would 
be departing from the law entirely.159 
To summarize: upon taking their oath, our judicial agents receive discretionary 
power. With this judicial power comes the corresponding duty to follow the 
instructions in “this Constitution” in good faith. To do so, judges must forgo the 
opportunity to act on the basis of anything but the letter and the spirit of the law. 
They must act not only consistent with the letter of the instrument from which 
they draw their power, but they must also not use their discretion under that 
instrument to pursue extralegal goals. Where the letter of the Constitution is 
unclear, judges must turn to the law’s spirit. 
IV. GOOD-FAITH CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
No theory of constitutional interpretation or construction can prevent federal 
judges from acting opportunistically if those judges do not value adherence to 
rules that are distinguishable from their preferences;160 do not care about how 
they are regarded by their colleagues and professional peers;161 and do not take 
their oath to the written Constitution of the United States seriously.162 But by  
158. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
479, 500 (2013) (explaining that “the public context may include facts about the general point or 
purpose of the provision (as opposed to, the ‘intention of the author’), and those facts may resolve 
[textual] ambiguities”). 
159. We recognize that judges may have difficulty identifying even one among several functions of a 
given provision or determining whether one function rather than another is more contextually relevant 
and should be given priority, given scarce time and research capacity. Our point is normative, not 
epistemic: judges should seek, identify, and use the original functions to guide their implementation of 
the original meaning of the text. 
160. But see generally MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: 
LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011) (adducing evidence that legal factors 
influence judicial behavior as well as ideological factors). 
161. But see generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006) (adducing evidence that judges’ desires for good reputations influence their 
behavior). 
162. But see generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (adducing 
evidence that judges “audition” for higher office). 
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articulating guidelines for how judges are to engage in good-faith construction 
and thereby enabling observers to monitor construction and identify opportunistic 
abuses of judicial discretion, we might make it more likely that (1) that good-faith 
construction will take place, and (2) bad-faith construction will be critically 
examined, censured, and discouraged. 
A. GUIDELINES FOR GOOD-FAITH CONSTRUCTION 
It bears emphasizing that, although constitutional construction necessarily 
takes place every time constitutional text is given legal effect, judges need not— 
indeed, should not—enter into the construction zone in every constitutional case. 
The communicative content of terms that appear to be “thin” and therefore 
require entrance into the construction zone may be considerably “thicker” after 
careful empirical work. The original public meaning of seemingly open-textured 
provisions can be much more precise once their contextually enriched meaning is 
revealed by rigorous research. 
For example, the original meaning of “recess” in the Recess Appointments 
Clause refers to the period between “sessions” of Congress, once context is taken 
into account.163 “Commerce . . . among the several states” encompasses activity 
of particular kinds: the trade, exchange and transportation or movement of 
things.164 The Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment” for-
bids cruel innovation in punishment—specifically, punishments that are unjustly 
harsh in light of longstanding common-law practice.165 
The attempt by originalists to recapture the more determinate thicker 
meaning of these and other clauses is in its relative infancy. Despite the pub-
lic prominence of constitutional originalism, the number of originalist schol-
ars has been few (indeed, almost miniscule if compared to the numbers of 
living constitutionalists)—and not enough given the importance of the task. 
Work on rigorous originalist methodology and the development of best prac-
tices for originalist scholarship is recent.166 Important tools, such as corpus 
linguistics, have only just been introduced.167   
163. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, UCLA L. 
REV. 1487, 1487 (2005). 
164. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 
101 (2001). 
165. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 441 (2017); John 
F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745–46 (2008). 
166. See Solum, supra note 67, at 288–91. 
167. See James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original 
Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 21, 21 (2016); 
Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J.F. 57, 
57 (2016); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using 
Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1202 
(2017). 
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Further, as Gary Lawson has observed, the early originalists—like Berger 
and Bork—were moral readers.168 They were primarily focused on “judges, de-
mocracy, constraint, and authority,” not on “meaning, language, and communi-
cation.”169 The empirical turn in originalism—originalism’s shift from (as 
Lawson puts it) an “intellectual rather than political enterprise”—is quite 
recent.170 
Once enriched, the seemingly vague or ambiguous language of the Consti- 
tution may be rendered precise enough to enable judges to arrive at many more 
answers to interpretive questions that, if not certainly correct, are more plausi-
ble than any competing answers.171 When, however, a determinate answer can-
not be ascertained through interpretation, judges must enter the construction 
zone. A rule must be applied—either a previously formulated rule or a new 
one. We hold that that rule must be informed by the Constitution’s original 
spirit. 
Just as discovering the “spirit of the deal” requires an investigation into “the com-
mercial context in which [a contract is] created,”172 discovering the functions of the 
Constitution’s various clauses and structural design entails investigation into the 
context in which they were enacted. This is a familiar task for originalists—the in-
quiry into the law’s spirit is no less grounded in empirical facts than inquiry into the 
law’s letter.173 Constitutions, statutes, and contracts are products of human design, 
and—as we will elaborate—one need not read minds to determine what they are 
designed to do.174 The Constitution was the result of a careful, if often contentious, 
“design process.” Each provision and structural design element was crafted for a rea-
son or reasons. We discover these reasons by examining how the Constitution’s var-
ious components interact with one another, as well as by consulting what was said 
about them both in public and in private. 
Judges do, however, need to take care to properly identify the level of abstrac-
tion at which the function of a provision or design element should be character-
ized, just as they must take care to properly identify the level of abstraction at 
which to understand particular words. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport 
168. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or: Could Fleming Be Right This 
Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1472 (2016). 
169. Id. We suspect this was because they were engaged in constitutional construction or application, 
not interpretation. 
170. Id. at 1473. 
171. See GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS 75 (2017) (arguing that a 
legal proposition “is deemed correct if it is better, meaning more plausible, than its available 
alternatives”). 
172. U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016). 
173. For a valuable illustration, consider Justice Scalia’s deep-dive into English common-law 
history—including case reports, legal commentaries, and petitions responding to perceived abuses—to 
identify “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed” in Crawford v. Washington. 541 
U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
174. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and 
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 196 (1986) (“A document can manifest a single purpose 
even though those who drafted and approved it had a variety of private motives and expectations.”). 
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have rightly warned about the dangers of the “abstract meaning fallacy”— 
concluding that constitutional language has an abstract meaning without suffi-
ciently considering the alternative possibilities.175 
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy 2 (Northwestern 
Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 11-67, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1959668 [https://perma.cc/PX4M-9SKR]. 
Judges must be equally 
wary of settling upon abstract purpose or function without closely investigat-
ing historical sources, with an eye toward capturing those functions that the 
Framers, Ratifiers, and members of the public understood particular provisions 
to serve. 
Judges should then specify a construction—an implementing doctrine176—that 
resolves the case at hand in a manner that is consistent with the relevant original 
function, and susceptible of application to future cases of a similar kind. A “rule” 
which applies in one case only is not a rule at all. Nor is a rule set forth without 
explanation likely to equip judges to effectuate a provision in future cases. Once 
derived and sufficiently explained, however, a construction can stand on its own. 
In future cases, judges need only explain why and how a construction applies and 
then apply it. They need not continually revisit how that construction facilitates 
the original function or spirit of the text. 
The application of such constructions is what we call “constitutional law.” 
Of course, as preexisting doctrines meet new and unanticipated circumstances, 
these implementing rules of constitutional law may have to be adjusted and 
refined to fit the functions the textual provisions were adopted to perform. 
That, indeed, is just how the common law of contract was developed over the 
centuries.177 
Good-faith interpretation and construction thus consists in three separate 
steps:  
(1) 
 
 
Make a good-faith effort to determine the original meaning of the text of the 
relevant provision and to resolve the case on the basis of the letter.  
(2) Failing this, identify the original functions or spirit of the provision, and  
(3) Formulate a rule to be followed in the case at hand and in the future that is  
(a) 
 
consistent with the letter and  
(b) designed to implement the original functions of  
(i) 
 
 
the provision at issue or, failing that,  
(ii) the structure in which the provision appears or, failing that,  
(iii) the Constitution as a whole. 
175. 
176. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (discussing 
the Court’s implementation strategies for enforcing constitutional values). 
177. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 109–32 
(2d ed. 2014) (identifying the evolutionary nature of the common-law decision process as a discovery 
mechanism). See generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1987). 
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Each step must be performed candidly and carefully, explaining why the 
implementing rule is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, setting forth 
the rule clearly and concisely, and modeling its proper application. 
B. DETECTING BAD-FAITH CONSTRUCTION 
One way to understand bad-faith constitutional construction is as follows: 
When a judge takes an oath to follow “this Constitution,” the judge forgoes the 
opportunity to change the Constitution through adjudication. It is bad faith for a 
party to exercise his or her discretion to improve, evade, or get out of the deal. If 
judges use their discretion to adopt constitutional constructions that undermine 
rather than adhere to the spirit of “this Constitution,” they are evading the deal 
they made when they received powers in return for their oath to uphold “this 
Constitution”—and thus, whatever their motives, they are acting in bad faith. 
Lee Strang has cautioned against evaluating whether originalist interpretation 
has been performed in subjective good faith.178 Such inquiries, argues Strang, 
invite scholars and litigants to “delv[e] into the nonjudicial utterances of judges 
to try to show subjective bad faith,” potentially undermining and even paving the 
way for the overruling of valuable rules on the basis of (unwarranted) doubt con-
cerning the motivations of those who formulated them.179 Further, “intrusive 
search[es] into judges’ nonjudicial writings and statements” could “discourage 
qualified personnel from accepting judicial office.”180 
These points are well taken. Yet, whereas determining whether a particular 
construction is a “good-faith construction” does involve inquiry into the subjec-
tive purpose of the judge, that inquiry is limited to a singular and narrow question: 
Did the judge attempt to recapture the forgone opportunity to change or amend 
the written Constitution, after having been empowered as a judge on condition of 
taking an oath of fidelity to “this Constitution”? Further, because the identity 
of the function or functions of a particular provision is a fact to be discovered 
rather than invented, whether a judge has acted with subjective bad faith can and 
should be assessed objectively by examining the function or functions of the text 
the judge has identified and the evidence put forward by the judge concerning the 
identity of those functions. There is no need to directly inquire into her mental 
state. 
An objective appraisal of good faith can look like this: Has the judge taken 
account of the text, structure, and history of the provision? Has she explained 
why text, structure, and history point towards a particular function? If a provision 
serves as a number of functions and she has concluded that one is particularly rel-
evant, has she explained why? If more than one is relevant, has she sought to 
identify which function is of primary importance? Finally: does her construction 
178. See Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist 
Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1743–50 (2010). 
179. Id. at 1744. 
180. Id. 
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have the effect of rendering the text a nullity, of little or no practical significance, 
thereby eliminating it as a constraint on the fiduciary agents of the people? 
Evaluating constructions is a more complex matter. It will be difficult to deter-
mine whether the articulation of a rule following a good-faith effort to ascertain 
the letter and a successful identification of the spirit of a provision is itself per-
formed in good faith. Without knowing how a newly-minted rule will apply in 
future cases, we can only evaluate the arguments that the judge has made to jus-
tify the rule and the consequences of the application in a given case. 
In assessing whether a judicial construction was in good faith, we may ask the 
following: Has the judge given a convincing explanation of why the rule is con-
sistent with the spirit of the provision? Has she explained how the rule will pro-
duce results consistent with the spirit of the provision, not just in this case, but in 
future cases? Has she considered and responded to counterarguments? Is it evi-
dent how the application of the rule in the instant case produces a result that is 
consistent with the spirit? 
It may be that a rule that is effective at implementing a constitutional guarantee 
at time A turns out to be ineffective, counterproductive, or unmanageable at time 
B.181 When confronted with arguments that a rule has failed in practice to effectu-
ate the law’s spirit, judges must be prepared to reevaluate that rule. At the same 
time, a decision to preserve a bad rule is not necessarily an act of bad faith. We 
should ask: Has the judge acknowledged any credible evidence in the record that 
a rule has proven ineffective, counterproductive, or unmanageable? Has he 
responded to arguments based on that evidence? Has he applied the rule in the 
case at hand in a way that inspires confidence in the rule? 
Good-faith construction will not always produce one and only one rule. Thus, 
it will not eliminate the discretion lodged in the fiduciary agents of the people, 
any more than the duty of good-faith performance of contracts eliminates all 
discretion enjoyed by contracting parties. That does not trouble us—we do not 
seek to eliminate discretion.182 As compared to alternative approaches that leave 
all linguistically permissible rules on the table, our approach makes it marginally 
more likely that judges will arrive at rules that are consistent with the 
Constitution’s spirit. The latter is our primary goal. 
Finally, suppose that Strang is correct that overzealous policing of judicial bad 
faith in the context of constitutional interpretation may discourage qualified per-
sonnel from seeking office. That concern could be addressed through working to 
create a legal-cultural norm pursuant to which we are justified in presuming good 
faith and the burden on those who would charge bad faith is therefore properly 
demanding. 
181. We hope to explore how judges can deal with this problem in greater depth in a future work. 
182. Good-faith construction may not always yield one and only one result—thus, it may not always 
be determinate—but the set of results that it will produce will not be “identical with the set of all 
imaginable results”—thus, it will not be indeterminate, but underdeterminate. Solum, supra note 39, at 
473. 
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V. EXAMPLES OF GOOD-FAITH AND BAD-FAITH CONSTRUCTION 
To show how good-faith construction can work in practice and how we can dis-
tinguish between good-faith and bad-faith construction, we now consider two 
judicially-constructed doctrines. 
A. GOOD-FAITH CONSTRUCTION: THE REASONABLE REGULATION OF FIREARMS 
Demonstrating that any particular construction is consistent (or inconsistent) 
with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution requires a deeper dive into both 
the original meaning and original function(s) of the relevant text than is feasible 
in this space. So, to illustrate what we mean by good-faith construction, we turn 
to the judicial implementation of a constitutional provision, the original public 
meaning of which has been extensively examined by scholars and authoritatively 
adjudicated by the Supreme Court after consideration of voluminous evidence: 
The Second Amendment. We choose Heller, not merely for its current sociopolit-
ical relevance, but because it illustrates the incapacity of originalist interpretation 
supported by extensive research, standing alone, to resolve certain hard constitu-
tional questions. 
Although acknowledging that others will differ, for purposes of this analysis, 
we take as given what we think the weight of the evidence establishes:183 that the 
Court was correct to hold in District of Columbia v. Heller184 that “the right to 
keep and bear arms” in the Second Amendment refers to a right possessed by 
individuals; a right that may be exercised outside the context of actual service in 
an organized militia. We also take as given that this individual right is among the 
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” that is expressly pro-
tected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.185 How then should courts 
give legal effect to this right? 
We have already touched briefly upon a much-disparaged186 passage in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Heller in which he described a number of laws 
targeting particular weapons and persons as “presumptively lawful.” Yet, because 
he presented little or no historical evidence that the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment’s text was understood to include such exceptions, his asser-
tions had the appearance of what Justice Scalia, in a heated dissent in another 
case, called “bald, unreasoned disclaimer[s].”187 
We do not believe that the available evidence of original meaning establishes 
that the laws that Justice Scalia identified as “presumptively lawful” should in 
183. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service 
in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237 (2004) (rebutting later arguments that the Second 
Amendment only protects a militia-conditioned individual right of persons); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. 
Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996) 
(rebutting earlier arguments that the Second Amendment protects only a collective right of states to 
preserve their militia). 
184. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
185. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 813, 850 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
186. For a thorough demolition, see generally Lund, supra note 10. 
187. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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fact be treated as such. If not, that determination could only be justified as a 
construction, not as an interpretation, of the Second Amendment. Wishing the 
interpretation–construction distinction away does not make it so. What Justice 
Scalia needed to do—in a future case, not in Heller—was to more carefully 
identify the spirit of the Second Amendment to see if the exceptions he flagged 
were consistent with that spirit. So how is this to be done? 
One should begin by identifying the function or functions that the text was 
designed to perform. Many constitutional provisions were designed to perform 
several different functions, and judges must be sensitive to the context of the case 
at hand in deciding which function should guide construction. For example, the 
Second Amendment’s prefatory clause indicates a particular function that some 
have used to narrow the scope of the right to keep and bear arms: “A well regu-
lated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State . . . .”188 But to ascer-
tain the content of this function, one must start with the original meaning of these 
words. 
“Militia” here refers to the “general militia,” consisting of the body of the 
people with their own private arms,189 which was deemed “necessary to the secu-
rity of a free State.”190 At least one of the original purposes of the Second 
Amendment was to ensure that the newly-created federal government would not 
eliminate the pre-existing general militia.191 
Yet, though the preservation of a general militia composed of individual citi-
zens with their own arms be its express purpose, the Amendment does not specify 
the function or functions to be fulfilled by the general militia or armed population. 
There is powerful evidence that the general militia was understood as necessary 
for both collective and personal self-defense.192 Thus, the relevant function of the 
Second Amendment in cases involving modern restrictions on the private owner-
ship of weapons is that of ensuring that law-abiding citizens can defend them-
selves against public or private violence—from tyrannical government or from 
188. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
189. In the eighteenth century, the term “militia” referred to what was called the “general” militia 
consisting of “the body of” or “the whole of” the people. See, e.g., VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 
1776 § 13 (1776) (“[A] well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people . . . .”); 3 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 78, at 425 (remarks of George Mason at Virginia ratifying convention: “Who are 
the militia? They consist now of the whole people.”); Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 25, 1788), in 
2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 88, at 341 (“A militia, when properly formed, are in fact 
the people themselves . . . and include . . . all men capable of bearing arms . . . .”). It did not refer to 
organized military units, which were either “select” militia or a standing army, but encompassed all of 
those who qualified for military service. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE 
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 163 (1994) (“The argument that today’s National Guardsmen, 
members of a select militia, would constitute the only persons entitled to keep and bear arms has no 
historical foundation.”). 
190. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
191. This was common ground between the Heller majority and Justice Stevens in dissent, both of 
whom cited copious historical materials in support. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 596–600 (majority opinion) with id. at 641–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
192. See id. at 579–92; see, e.g., PA. CONST. art XIII (1776) (“That the people have a right to bear 
arms for the defence of themselves and the state . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
2018] THE LETTER & THE SPIRIT 39 
ordinary criminals.193 It is that historically identifiable function that judges should 
apply in determining how the right to bear arms might “reasonably” be regulated. 
Thus, for example, a ban on those “arms” that create an unreasonable risk of 
harm to innocent third parties even when properly used in self-defense may well 
be consistent with the original spirit of the Second Amendment, given the great 
variety of available arms that do not create such a risk. Under this implementing 
doctrine, if fully automatic “machine guns” that can “spray” bullets by holding 
down the trigger create an unreasonable risk of harm to innocent third parties 
when properly used in self-defense, then such weapons may constitutionally be 
banned. 
In recent years, lower courts have developed implementing doctrines which 
distinguish reasonable from unreasonable regulations of firearms.194 One example 
is Ezell v. City of Chicago, in which a panel of the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit evaluated a city ordinance that required citizens to acquire gun 
range proficiency before they could own firearms—while at the same time ban-
ning all gun ranges from within the city limits.195 
In her opinion evaluating the gun range ban, Judge Diane Sykes distin-
guished the “interpretive” issue of whether the Second Amendment protected 
an individual or a collective right—which she took as settled by Heller—from 
the “doctrinal” question of how to implement the right.196 A second interpre-
tive question involved identifying the original “scope” of the right: “Is the re-
stricted activity protected by the Second Amendment in the first place? The 
answer requires a textual and historical inquiry into original meaning.”197 This, 
she explained, is analogous to First Amendment inquiries into whether particu-
lar types of speech are—like fraud or obscenity—outside the scope of the 
Amendment.198 
If “the government cannot establish this—if the historical evidence is inconclu-
sive or suggests that the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected,” then 
there must be a further “inquiry into the strength of the government’s justification 
for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”199 In 
193. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 
39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117 (1987) (observing that political oppression is not “the main reason modern 
civilians want to possess arms nor the main effect that private possession of arms has on the political 
community” and proceeding to consider whether the underlying right to self-defense encompasses also 
“the people’s right to the means of defending themselves from [private violence]”). 
194. See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (carry outside 
the home); Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016) (gun stores); Friedman v. City 
of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (assault weapons); Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 
F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014) (safe storage laws). 
195. 651 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2011). 
196. Id. at 700. 
197. Id. at 701 (citing Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self- 
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1449 (2009)). 
198. See id. at 702. 
199. Id. at 703. 
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short, there must be “heightened” scrutiny, not the “any conceivable rationale” 
approach of “rational basis” scrutiny.200 
Sykes opted for a First Amendment-style approach consisting of two steps. 
First, “a severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed self- 
defense will require an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close 
fit between the government’s means and its end.”201 Second, laws that restrict ac-
tivity “lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right, laws that 
merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens on the right may be more 
easily justified. How much more easily depends on the relative severity of the 
burden and its proximity to the core of the right.”202 Sykes then concluded that 
because the government’s “claimed public-safety concerns” were supported by 
“no data or expert opinion,” they failed the articulated test and were thus 
unconstitutional.203 
Legislators, too, have a fiduciary duty to the people to exercise their discretion-
ary powers in good faith. As Justice Bradley put it when discussing states’ re-
served police powers, “there are certain fundamental rights which this right of 
regulation cannot infringe. It may prescribe the manner of their exercise, but it 
cannot subvert the rights themselves.”204 Sykes’s implementing doctrine is calcu-
lated to identify when the legislature is opportunistically seeking to subvert the 
right to keep and bear arms rather than merely regulating the manner of its exer-
cise. Hers is a good-faith constitutional construction. 
But judges may also seek to subvert a right under the rubric of construction. 
We now turn to an example of such bad-faith construction. 
B. BAD-FAITH CONSTRUCTION: THE SUBSTANTIAL-EFFECTS DOCTRINE 
In a series of cases, the New Deal Supreme Court held that Congress could reg-
ulate wholly intrastate activity that, when combined or “aggregated” with other 
like activity, has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. In the 1937 case 
of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court began this doctrinal innova-
tion by allowing Congress to empower the National Labor Relations Board “to 
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting 
commerce.”205 
The problem was not with the statute’s definition of “commerce,” which was 
faithful to both original public meaning and precedent.206 The problem was with 
200. Id. at 701 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational 
basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on 
irrational laws, and would have no effect.” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 
n.27 (2008))). 
201. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 709. 
204. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (1 Wall) 36, 114 (1873) (Bradley, J. dissenting). 
205. 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). 
206. See id. at 31 (quoting National Labor Relations Act § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1935)) (“The 
term ‘commerce’ means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several 
States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other 
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the function of the doctrine that the Court devised to enable Congress to reach 
wholly intrastate activity because of its “effect” on interstate commerce. Had this 
doctrine been confined to actions that literally burden or obstruct interstate com-
merce itself, it would have been within the realm of good-faith construction.207 
But it was soon extended well beyond. 
Four years later, the Court in United States v. Darby extended the power of 
Congress to regulate manufacturing by prohibiting “the employment of workmen 
in the production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed 
wages and hours.”208 Once again, the problem was not with the Court’s interpre-
tation of the text of the Commerce Clause. The Court acknowledged that the term 
“commerce” did not include the activity of manufacturing: “While manufacture 
is not of itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods inter-
state is such commerce and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indu-
bitably a regulation of the commerce.”209 
The Court then made clear that the substantial-effects doctrine was in fact 
based on an expansive reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause:210 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regula-
tion of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate 
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress 
over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce.211 
The citation to the Necessary and Proper Clause case of McCulloch for this prop-
osition, rather than the Commerce Clause case of Gibbons v. Ogden,212 was a 
tell.213 
Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within 
the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other 
State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.”). 
207. Indeed, in contrast with Darby and Wickard, the New Deal Justices thought their decision on 
Jones & Laughlin Steel was consistent with existing Commerce Clause doctrine. See Barry Cushman, 
Inside the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1937, 2016 S. CT. REV. 367, 406 (2017) (“[M]any 
contemporary observers saw the opinions in [the Labor Board Cases] as fully consistent with prevailing 
doctrine.”); id. at 408 (“[W]hen Congress asserted genuinely novel claims of regulatory authority over 
manufacturing and agriculture . . . several of the Justices did not regard the Labor Board decisions as 
providing adequate constitutional foundation for those measures.”). 
208. 312 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). 
209. Id. at 113. 
210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
211. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118–19 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 
(1819)). 
212. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
213. See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 807–08 
(1996) (observing that “the New Deal Court’s own constitutional justification for its radical expansion 
of the scope of federal power over commerce was that the congressional measures in question were valid 
exercises of the power granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause” and that “the Court did not simply 
and directly enlarge the scope of the Commerce Clause itself, as is often believed”). 
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In a crucial move, the Court also rejected any consideration of whether the 
motive or purpose of the prohibition was to regulate wholly intrastate noncom-
mercial activity: “The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce 
are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the 
Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no 
control.”214 
Thus, although citing McCulloch in support of its expansive reading of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court repudiated sub silentio Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s limiting principle in that case: 
[S]hould congress [sic], under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws 
for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would 
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a deci-
sion come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.215 
Simply put, the Court in Darby denied that it had the authority to make an inquiry 
into the possibility of pretext that Marshall insisted that the Court was duty-bound 
to make. 
The next important step in this doctrinal development came in Wickard v. 
Filburn.216 In Wickard, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of Darby that Congress 
may reach activity, “even if [the] activity be local and though it may not be 
regarded as commerce,”217 thereby preserving the original meaning of the 
Commerce Clause. By using the substantial effects construction of Darby, the 
Court in Wickard was able to reach the conclusion that such local and noncom-
mercial activity “may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts 
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.”218 
But the Court in Wickard then extended Darby’s substantial-effects doctrine 
still farther. The Court added what has come to be called the “aggregation princi-
ple.” According to this constitutional construction, even if the effect of a particu-
lar person’s activity has on interstate commerce is “trivial by itself,” Congress 
may still reach it if “his contribution, taken together with that of many others sim-
ilarly situated, is far from trivial.”219 
The substantial-effects doctrine—as supplemented by the aggregation 
principle—is a construction ostensibly employed to implement the (textual) power 
of Congress to regulate “commerce . . . among the states,”220 together with the in-
cidental powers affirmed in the Necessary and Proper Clause. But it is profoundly 
unfaithful to the structure in which both clauses appear—the scheme of enumer-
ated Congressional powers established by Article I, Section 8. The original 
214. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. 
215. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423 (emphases added). 
216. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
217. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 127–28 (emphasis added). 
220. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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function of this structural design element was to specifically identify those legisla-
tive powers “to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the har-
mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation,”221 rather than rely on any general and vague grant of legislative 
power that would be insufficient to prevent a consolidated national government. 
That this was the original function of the enumerated powers scheme was 
acknowledged by the New Deal Court Justices themselves when they declared in 
Jones & Laughlin Steel that: 
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of our 
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects 
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in 
view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction 
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.222 
And yet this is exactly what the substantial-effects doctrine as expanded in Darby 
and Wickard accomplished: the obliteration of the distinction between what is 
national and what is local, potentially empowering a completely centralized 
government. 
That Darby and Wickard represented a departure from the doctrines to which 
the Court continued to adhere in Jones & Laughlin Steel is evidenced by the fact 
that “Darby (1941) cited the Labor Board Cases only once in passing; Wickard v. 
Filburn (1942) did not cite them at all. The Justices of the early 1940s treated the 
Labor Board Cases not as a germinal manifesto on the scope of federal power, 
but instead as yesterday’s news.”223 Indeed, the Court found this further extension 
of congressional power so problematic, it held the case over for reargument from 
one term to the next.224 
To reach the conclusion that the New Deal Court was engaging in bad-faith 
construction, we need not directly inquire into the subjective motives of the 
Justices. As it happens, however, we now have access to the thoughts of the jus-
tice who wrote the opinion in Wickard. 
As presented by Barry Cushman, Justice Robert Jackson was fully aware that 
the doctrine the Court adopted in Wickard would fundamentally depart from 
precedent and leave the text of the Constitution enumerating the powers of 
Congress unenforced by the courts. In a memo to his law clerk in the summer of 
221. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). As 
explained by Joseph Lynch, this wording of the Virginia plan was replaced by the enumeration of 
Congressional powers after the great compromise in which the states would have equal representation in 
the Senate. See Joseph M. Lynch, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT 21 (1999). 
222. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
223. Cushman, supra note 207, at 408 (footnotes omitted). 
224. Id. (“[E]ven a Court now dominated by Roosevelt appointees required reargument and a good 
deal of soul searching before a majority could be assembled to uphold federal regulation of the growth 
of wheat for home consumption on Roscoe Filburn’s farm.”). 
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1942, Jackson wrote: “If we sustain the present Act, I don’t see how we can ever 
sustain states’ rights again as against a Congressional exercise of the commerce 
power.”225 And “[i]f we sustain the present case, the judicial shibboleths as to li-
mitation of the commerce power are without practical meaning, and that is within 
the commerce power which Congress desires to regulate.”226 In another memo 
Jackson wrote: 
It is perhaps time that we recognize that the introduction of economic deter-
minism into constitutional law of interstate commerce marked the end of judi-
cial control of the scope of federal activity. . . . A frank holding that the 
interstate commerce power has no limits except those which Congress sees fit 
to observe might serve a wholesome purpose. In order to be unconstitutional 
by the judicial process if this Act is sustained, the relation between interstate 
commerce and the regulated activity would have to be so absurd that it would 
be laughed out of Congress.227 
But the Justices in Wickard decided against a “frank holding.” Indeed, with 
rare exceptions,228 the New Deal Court’s expansion of federal power was accom-
plished not by expressly abandoning the original meaning of the letter of the 
Constitution, but by adopting constitutional constructions that undercut its spirit. 
The function of enumerating powers was to keep Congress within textually speci-
fied bounds—thereby preserving our federal system—not to empower Congress 
to regulate anything it “sees fit to observe might serve a wholesome purpose.”229 
Because the aggregation principle effectively did the latter, it must be understood 
as a bad-faith construction. 
VI. OBJECTIONS TO GOOD-FAITH CONSTRUCTION 
Good-faith construction meets a well-recognized need to guide judges in dis-
charging their duty when the original meaning of the text runs out—and to pro-
vide members of the public with assurance that they will not be exposed to 
arbitrary judicial power. That is to say, it aspires to do for constitutional construc-
tion what Burton’s “forgone opportunities” theory did for the duty of good-faith 
performance in contract law, and what original meaning originalism did for con-
stitutional interpretation. We now turn to some potential objections to our theory. 
A. DOES IT REVIVE THE OLD ORIGINALISM? 
Viewing proper construction as a product of, and limited to, the original spirit 
of the Constitution strikes some of the same chords as appeals to the original 
225. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION 216–18 (1998). 
226. Id. at 218. 
227. Id. 
228. See, e.g., United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (holding that the 
power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate insurance). 
229. CUSHMAN, supra note 225, at 218. 
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intentions of the Framers—that is, it echoes proto-originalism.230 The appeal of 
proto-originalists’ invocation of “original intent” has always been that it purports 
to put the “Framers’ values” ahead of the judge’s own, and thereby constrains the 
judge’s discretion. This is just what we are advocating: putting the objectively 
identified original functions of the text itself ahead of extralegal preferences. 
But we are not advocating a return to proto-originalism. When seeking to apply 
the text to modern circumstances, proto-originalists often went beyond identify-
ing the original function of a provision to ask, “What would the Framers do?” 
One of us has disparaged this as “channeling” the Framers.231
See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 
405 (1996) (“One may think of this as a type of constitutional ‘channeling’ in which originalist 
clairvoyants ask: ‘Oh Framers, tell us what would you think about the following law?’”). For a call for 
originalists to return to this approach, see Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting Originalism 
Back on Track, LAW & LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/meanings- 
or-decisions-getting-originalism-back-on-track/ [https://perma.cc/Q4U2-L7PE] (describing “original 
decisions” originalism). 
 Unlike inquiring 
into the communicative content of constitutional text at the point of ratification, 
asking how the Framers would have applied the text to facts inconceivable to 
them—think violent video games232—is a counter-factual thought experiment. 
We do not recommend it. 
We also do not recommend relying entirely upon how the Framers thought the 
text applied, or would apply, to particular factual circumstances, which has been 
called “original expected application.”233 Had they actually conceived of a partic-
ular application, they may well have been in error. For example, we believe that 
eight Justices were wrong in how they applied the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to sex discrimination in Bradwell v. Illinois, irrespective of whether the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that excluding women from the 
practice of law was reasonable.234 
In contrast, good-faith construction seeks to identify empirical facts: the origi-
nal functions of the Constitution’s provisions and structural design elements. The 
Constitution was the result of a careful—if often contentious—design process. 
Each constitutional provision and structural design element was crafted for a rea-
son or multiple reasons. We can discover these reasons by examining how the 
Constitution’s various components interact with one another, and by consulting 
what was said about them both in public and in private. 
To appreciate why it is appropriate to consult private as well as publicly avail-
able evidence, consider an old-fashioned analogue watch. A watch has a primary 
function—to tell time—that is discoverable by examining it and figuring out 
what the numbers around the circumference and the hands that point to them 
230. Not to be confused with the intentionalism of Alexander, Kay, or Prakash, which is resolutely 
empirical. 
231. 
 
232. See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (deciding “whether a 
California law imposing restrictions on violent video games comports with the First Amendment”). 
233. Balkin, supra note 27, at 293. 
234. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1872); see BARNETT, supra note 112, at 87– 
89, 117–21 (explaining why Bradwell was wrongly decided). 
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represent. Now open the watch and see the flywheel, gears, and springs, each of 
which has its own secondary function that facilitates the fulfillment of the watch’s 
primary function. Unless one is a watchmaker, the exact function of each part is 
difficult to discern. And these intended functions of the constituent parts of the 
watch are different than the motives of the watch designer, which may have been 
to earn a paycheck, or even the esteem of fellow watch designers. 
One way to identify these functions would be to speak with the watch designer. 
Failing that, one could consult the written comments by the designer about what 
each part is supposed to do and why it was designed in a particular way rather 
than in another way. The watch designer’s views are authoritative, not because he 
has some legal power over a watch user, but because of what he knows about 
watch design in general and the choices he made when designing this particular 
watch. 
As one of us has observed, the Framers of the Constitution can be viewed as 
“designers or architects of the lawmaking ‘machine.’”235 Accordingly, 
[w]e consult them when we want to know how the machine is supposed to 
work, not because they are a surrogate for the majority of the people who lived 
two hundred years ago, but because they might have special insight into the 
machine that they designed—especially its internal quality-control procedures. 
They gave its purpose and design much thought—perhaps more thought than 
we have—and we benefit from their learning in interpreting their design.236 
Their beliefs about the functional construction of the Constitution play an eviden-
tiary role. 
This way of conceptualizing Framers’ intent has two advantages. First, the 
“Framers-as-Designers” approach “explains why we remain so fascinated and 
influenced by the views of the small group of persons who framed—as opposed 
to ratified—the Constitution . . . .”237 Indeed, “we generally confine our attention 
to just a handful of the Framers, such as James Madison or James Wilson” or 
Gouverneur Morris, who had the most direct role in actually drafting the text of 
the Constitution, “as opposed to the views of other members of the convention or 
of the reigning majority of the time.”238 We pay careful attention to these 
Framers in particular because we believe that they had unique insight into the 
functioning of the system they helped design. With regard to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, scholars have rightly focused attention on John Bingham, its princi-
pal drafter.239 
235. See Barnett, supra note 231, at 403, 408 (distinguishing “two reasons to consult the Framers. 
The first views the Framers as wardens; the second as designers or architects”). 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 408–09. 
238. Id. at 409. 
239. See, e.g., GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE 
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993); Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and 
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Second, “according to the Framers-as-Designers approach, we consult the writ-
ings of the Framers to discern not their specific hypothetical intentions towards 
particular legislation, but the [design] principles” that explain the specific provi-
sions and general structure of the Constitution.240 “Among these [design] princi-
ples are federalism, separation of powers,” and the duty to apply the Constitution 
as supreme law.241 
The Constitution can be thought of as describing a device or mechanism like a 
watch. Like a watch, the Constitution as a whole has functions (described in the 
Preamble). Like the flywheel, gears, and springs of a watch, each of its clauses 
was designed to work harmoniously with the others to fulfill those functions. 
Like a watch, each of its constituent parts have their own secondary functions as 
means to the more general ends.242 
Like a watch, the Constitution was the product of deliberate human design 
rather than uncoordinated human action.243 Where the functions or purposes of a 
provision are not obvious, we can attempt to reverse engineer the design from 
close examination of its workings. But we can also seek out the explanations left 
behind by its designers. Even if these explanations were not published, they 
would still help us to understand the functions of each constituent part. 
B. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE SUMMING PROBLEM? 
But wait! Didn’t Paul Brest and others demonstrate the impossibility of identi-
fying the collective intentions of myriad Framers and Ratifiers?244 Didn’t we see 
in Part II that this is why originalists moved to original meaning in the first place? 
Don’t all these same problems now return with originalist construction based on 
the “purposes” of the Constitution? 
Well, not so fast. Even Brest acknowledged that the “general purposes” of con-
stitutional provisions are ascertainable and that it is “a perfectly sensible strategy 
of constitutional decisionmaking” to seek to adhere to them.245 Judges, he 
the Story of American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the “Lost Clause”, 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 655– 
61 (2003); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and 
the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 340 (2011) (tracing Bingham’s 
drafting efforts and using his public statements about the text to inform interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
240. Barnett, supra note 231, at 409. 
241. Id. 
242. John Manning has drawn a similar distinction between the “ulterior” or “background” purposes 
of a statute and the “implemental” purposes that particular provisions are designed to achieve. See John 
F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 115 (“[T]he law’s ‘purpose,’ properly 
understood, embodies not merely a statute’s substantive ends (its ‘ulterior purposes’), but also 
Congress’s specific choices about the means to carry those ends into effect (its ‘implemental 
purposes’).”). 
243. With apologies to Friedrich Hayek. See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF 
SOCIALISM 6 (W.W. Bartley, III ed., 1988) (“To understand our civilisation, one must appreciate that the 
extended order resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously . . . .”). We note, 
however, that Hayek described government as a “deliberate contrivance.” 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, 
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 124 (1973). 
244. See supra Section II.A. 
245. Brest, supra note 19, at 231. 
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observed, “are more concerned with the adopters’ general purposes than with 
their intentions in a very precise sense.”246 Describing what he called “moderate 
intentionalism,” he wrote, “A moderate intentionalist applies a provision consist-
ent with the adopters’ intent at a relatively high level of generality, consistent 
with what is sometimes called the ‘purpose of the provision.’”247 The moderate 
intentionalist “attempts to understand what the adopters’ purposes might plausi-
bly have been, an aim far more readily achieved than a precise understanding of 
the adopters’ intentions.”248 
Together, two recent developments in philosophy suggest that the pursuit of, 
and adherence to, the adopters’ purposes, is indeed possible. The first is artifact 
theory, which defines an artifact as “an object that has been intentionally made or 
produced for a certain purpose.”249 
Risto Hilpinen, Artifact, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., Winter 2011 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/artifact/ [https://perma.cc/ 
M6KW-4ZTZ]. While this Article was in production, Hilpinen’s Encyclopedia entry was replaced by a 
new one. See Beth Preston, Artifact, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., forthcoming 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/artifact/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3XPC-YNMK] (last updated July 18, 2018). However, the Encyclopedia notes: “The latest version of 
the entry ‘Artifact’ (new, rewritten entry) is not yet archived and may change before it is archived in the 
Fall 2018 edition. You should, if possible, wait for the Fall 2018 archived edition of the Encyclopedia to 
cite this version.” Author and Citation Information for “Artifact,” in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=artifact [https://perma. 
cc/X79R-SU45] (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). We continue to quote from Hilpinen’s explanation of 
artifacts as it bears more closely on our own analysis. 
As explained by Risto Hilpinen, an artifact 
requires a maker or designer,250 but the concept “allows the possibility that an ar-
tifact has several authors who contribute to its production. Such objects may be 
termed ‘collectively produced artifacts.’”251 
Of particular relevance to our discussion of “Framers’ intent” is that artifacts 
have functions or purposes that are imparted to them by their makers or authors, 
which Hilpinen labels productive intentions.252 The very existence of the artifact, 
as well as its properties, “depend[s] on an author’s intention to make an object of 
certain kind.”253 The author’s actions to produce the object provides the “causal 
tie between an artifact . . . and its author’s productive intention.”254 Hilpinen 
details how we can discover the productive intention behind an artifact: 
An author’s productive intention is often expressed by cognitive artifacts 
which show the character of the intended artifact and the way it should be 
246. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
247. Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 
248. Id. (emphasis added). 
249. 
 
 
250. Hilpenen, supra note 249 (“An artifact has necessarily a maker or an author; thus artifact and 
author can be regarded as correlative concepts.”). 
251. Id. 
252. See id. (“When a person intends to make an object of a certain kind, his productive intention has 
as its content some description of the intended object, and the author’s intention ‘ties’ to an artifact a 
number of predicates which determine the intended character of the object.”). 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
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constructed, for example, a drawing, a diagram, or a model of the artifact, to-
gether with a list of parts and materials and a set of instructions (a precept) for 
the production process.255 
Hilpinen emphasizes that “[s]uch representations are especially important in the 
case of collectively produced complex artifacts” because they are “necessary for 
successful communication among the authors of the artifact and for the coordina-
tion of their productive actions.”256 
Finally, Hilpinen explains that “[t]he study of artifacts (qua artifacts) is 
intrinsically evaluative, since viewing an object as an artifact means viewing it in 
the light of intentions and purposes.”257 By this, Hilpinen means we evaluate 
whether the artifact well serves or ill serves its intended purposes. Nevertheless, 
the purposes the artifact was intended to serve can be discovered through empiri-
cal inquiry. 
Another example illustrates how artifact theory helps explain group intentions. 
Consider a smart phone, which is both far more complex than a watch and is 
designed by teams, with different groups working on hardware and software. 
Smart phones are designed to make telephone calls, to send and receive emails 
and text messages, to function as a camera, and to run apps that enable the phone 
to perform many other functions. Regardless of how many people contributed to 
its design, we have no difficulty discerning the functions that a smart phone was 
“intended” to perform. The summing problem simply drops away because identi-
fication of the functions as a property of the artifact is conceptually distinct from 
an inquiry into the psychological motives and purposes of the individual mem-
bers of the various design teams. 
From one perspective, the Constitution can itself be treated as an artifact that 
was made or created by a collective body of authors who had a productive inten-
tion to design an institution that functioned in certain ways to accomplish certain 
ends. From another perspective, the Constitution is the “set of instructions” or a 
recipe258 made by the authors to describe how the created complex artifact—a 
new national government—is supposed to operate. 
From either perspective, originalism is a commitment to following this original 
design, first, by correctly interpreting the instructions—the meaning of which 
was fixed at the time they were ratified into law—and, second, by implementing 
the instructions in a manner that faithfully effectuates their original functions. By 
this route, we arrive at a unified theory of originalism. 
The possibility of pursuing agreed-upon original functions also draws support 
from Christian List and Philip Pettit’s work on group agency.259 
See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS 
OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011). See generally Abraham Sesshu Roth, Shared Agency, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY: SUMMER 2017 EDITION, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/ 
List and Pettit’s 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. See Lawson, On Reading Recipes, supra note 37, at 1826. 
259. 
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entries/shared-agency/ [https://perma.cc/8SHN-HURA]. For theories of statutory interpretation that 
draw upon List and Pettit’s work, see generally RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
(Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2012); VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 
(2016). 
project is not only to identify the existence and character of group agents and 
their intentions, but to show how such agents can be held morally responsible 
for “their” actions. Along the way, they ask, “How could a multi-member 
group move from the distinct and possibly conflicting intentional attitudes of 
its members to a single system of such attitudes endorsed by the group as a 
whole?”260 In other words, “how can a group of individuals make collective 
judgments on some propositions based on the group members’ individual judg-
ments on them?”261 
Because their analysis of these questions is too rich to be fully reported here, 
the general conclusion that List and Pettit reach will need to suffice: 
A group forms a judgment or other attitude over a certain proposition when the 
proposition is presented for consideration—it is included in the agenda—and 
the group takes whatever steps are prescribed in its organizational structure for 
endorsing it. . . . [T]hese steps may involve a vote in the committee-of-the- 
whole, a vote in an authorized subgroup, or the determination of an appointed 
official.262 
To simplify, individual agents are individually responsible for their choice 
to design and make a group that has the structural or procedural features neces-
sary to reach decisions about its ends and to adopt means by which those ends 
can be achieved. Not just any collection of persons, but a group that is organ-
ized in this way, the authors contend, has all the requirements of a responsible 
agent. 
By integrating the concept of an artifact that is made for a purpose with a 
coherent account of group agency, we can identify a potential solution to the sum-
ming problem. Those who gathered in Philadelphia can be said to have organized 
themselves so as to constitute a group agent. The intentions of the Convention, 
the group agent, can be understood as the functions of the artifact they designed, 
the Constitution, as a whole and of its constituent parts (rather than the personal 
motives of each individual designer). 
We do not affirm the correctness of the above renditions of artifact or group 
agency theory. We have not done the work necessary to make an independent 
judgment about the soundness of either philosophical stance. But both the com-
mon sense of lawyers and contemporary philosophy support our contention that, 
when the intentions at issue are the functions of the various clauses of the 
Constitution, the summing problem isn’t all that problematic. 
260. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 259, at 42. 
261. Id. at 43. 
262. Id. at 159. 
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C. WHY DISTINGUISH INTERPRETATION FROM CONSTRUCTION? 
If the Constitution’s letter and spirit can both be ascertained empirically by 
investigating similar evidence, why persist in distinguishing between interpreta-
tion and construction? First, because identifying the communicative content of a 
text is still a different activity than identifying its intended function. Determining 
that the Second Amendment was designed to protect an individual right to pos-
sess and carry weapons does not tell us whether a machine gun is a protected 
“[a]rm[].” Second, because the respective activities have a lexical order, the spirit 
should not be used to override the letter. When the letter is clear, it controls. 
Consider that some nonoriginalists who favor a “living constitution” profess to 
be faithful to the Constitution’s text but operate by identifying the purpose or 
underlying principles of the text, and then leaving the text behind or limiting its 
scope. By this reasoning, if the original purpose of enumerating Congressional 
powers was to equip Congress to remedy truly “national” problems that are 
beyond the competence of states to address, and we now believe we know of 
national problems that cannot be addressed through those powers, the 
Constitution can be construed to give Congress additional powers to address 
them. 
We reject this move as illegitimate—as constitutional amendment by way of 
Article III rather than Article V. Keeping the interpretation–construction distinc-
tion in view and prioritizing the letter in cases of perceived conflict is necessary 
to prevent the spirit from being used, under the rubric of construction, to under-
mine or supplant what interpretation yields about the meaning of the letter. 
D. WILL THE SPIRIT LEAD JUDGES ASTRAY? 
Judicial recourse to the spirit of the law has a bad reputation among some tex-
tualist originalists, who offer two related objections to inquiry into the spirit of 
the text. First, these originalists say that the spirit of the law is simply not the law 
and thus not a proper object of judicial inquiry.263 Second, they claim that 
recourse to the spirit will lead judges to depart from the law’s communicative 
content.264 
Textualist originalists might cite Hamilton’s response to Anti-Federalists con-
cerns that federal judges would draw upon the spirit of the Constitution to enlarge 
federal power.265 In Federalist 81, Hamilton replied that “there is not a syllable in 
263. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 
443 (1990) (arguing that “laws themselves do not have purposes or spirits—only the authors are 
sentient”). As we saw, supra Section V.B., artifact and group agency theory undermine Judge 
Easterbrook’s claim. 
264. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 450 (2005) 
(concluding that, in the context of statutory interpretation, “efforts to augment or vary the text in the 
name of serving a genuine but unexpressed legislative intent risks displacing whatever bargain was 
actually reached”). 
265. See Brutus, Essay No. XII, (N.Y. J. Feb. 7, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI- 
FEDERALIST, supra note 88, at 423 (warning that judges will draw upon the spirit of the Constitution to 
“give [the Constitution] such a construction as to extend the powers of the general government, as much 
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the plan, which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws 
according to the spirit of the constitution.”266 
Yet the evidence is overwhelming that recourse to the spirit was a legitimate 
move in the context of construction during the Founding era.267 Nor should 
Hamilton’s statement be understood as rejecting it. After denying that the text of 
the Constitution empowers courts to “construe the laws according to the spirit of 
the constitution,” Hamilton added “or which gives them any greater latitude in 
this respect, than may be claimed by the courts of every state.”268 Yet, state courts 
could—and did—have recourse to the spirit.269 
Further, Hamilton went on to “admit . . . that the constitution ought to be the 
standard of construction for the laws, and that wherever there is an evident oppo-
sition, the laws ought to give place to the constitution,” thus acknowledging that 
the Constitution authorizes judges to hold unconstitutional laws void.270 But, he 
wrote, “this doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan 
of the convention; but from the general theory of a limited constitution.”271 Here 
Hamilton himself is relying on what we are calling the spirit of the text. 
Moreover, in Federalist 32, Hamilton accused Anti-Federalists of distorting 
the spirit of the proposed Constitution in their arguments that it conferred upon 
Congress an exclusive power to tax all articles other than imports and exports.272 
Hamilton pointed out that states were specifically forbidden from taxing exports 
and imports (absent “the consent of the Congress” or “for the purpose of execut-
ing [their] inspection laws”) “implies an admission that, if it were not inserted, 
the states would possess the power it excludes; and . . . a further admission, that 
as to all other taxes, the authority of the states remains undiminished.”273 
Therefore, Hamilton contended that it “could not have been the intention” to cre-
ate an exclusive taxing power in Congress, “and that [the Constitution] will not 
bear a construction of the kind.”274 Following the ratification of the Constitution, 
as possible, to the diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states”). Brutus did 
not deny the legitimacy of recourse to the spirit—he worried about abuses. See Brutus, Essay No. V, 
(N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 88, at 389 (“It is a 
rule in construing a law to consider the objects the legislature had in view in passing it, and to give it 
such an explanation as to promote their intention. The same rule will apply in explaining a 
constitution.”). Not all Anti-Federalists shared this precise concern—others worried that the spirit would 
be ignored. See Agrippa, Essay No. XVIII (MASS. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE 
ON THE CONSTITUTION 155, 156 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (fearing that “intention” of the Constitution 
would be disregarded). 
266. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 88, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton). 
267. HAMBURGER, supra note 103, at 54; Natelson, supra note 155, at 1253–54. 
268. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 88, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
269. See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 19 (1782). 
270. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 88, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton). 
271. Id. 
272. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 88, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton). 
273. Id. at 155–56; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Hamilton insisted that the Constitution 
granted federal and state governments “concurrent and co-equal authority” over general taxation. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 88, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton). 
274. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 88, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
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Hamilton would again have recourse to the spirit of the law in arguing that the 
Constitution authorized Congress to establish a national bank.275 
There is no objection to recourse to the original spirit that cannot be made 
against textualist originalism more generally. Yes, identifying original functions 
may be hard. Yes, implementing original functions is an enterprise that is fraught 
with peril. But so is ascertaining the linguistic meaning of centuries-old text. We 
claim only that recourse to the original spirit is the best available means of imple-
menting the original Constitution when the text runs out, even if it may well fall 
short of some unattainable ideal.276 
CONCLUSION: A UNIFIED THEORY OF ORIGINALISM 
In this Article, we have presented a unified theory of originalist interpreta-
tion and construction. We maintain that originalism cannot do without the 
interpretation–construction distinction, nor can originalists deny the existence 
of the construction zone. But neither can originalism do without a methodology 
that equips judges to navigate the construction zone. We have advanced three 
propositions in this Article:  
�
�
�
First, judges are fiduciaries of the people to whom the Constitution entrusts a 
great deal of discretionary power, and that such wide discretion is the basis of 
corresponding fiduciary duties.  
Second, upon voluntarily taking their oath, judges become morally and 
legally bound to follow faithfully the instructions given them in the written 
Constitution. 
Third, to be faithful to “this constitution,” judges should wield their discre-
tionary power consistently with the “supreme law of the land” —both letter 
and spirit—resolving cases through the spirit where the letter fails. 
If judges are to discharge what James Iredell described as “the duty of th[e] 
power”277 delegated to them, they need a methodology to guide them in exercis-
ing their discretion: such discretion must be exercised in good faith rather than 
opportunistically. Good-faith construction recognizes that, even when the letter 
of the law gives out, the law does not—and neither does judicial duty to follow 
and enforce the Constitution’s requirements. 
275. Hamilton denied that recourse to the personal intentions of the Framers was appropriate—the 
legally binding intention was to be sought “in the instrument itself.” Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on 
the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS 613, 625 
(Joanne B. Freeman ed., 2001). But in making his case for the constitutionality of the bank, he appealed 
to the “objects of [the government’s] specified powers.” Id. at 621. 
276. Put another way, we urge textualist originalists to resist the “nirvana fallacy.” See Harold 
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (criticizing policy 
analysis grounded in comparisons between imperfect existing institutions and unattainable alternatives). 
277. James Iredell, Address to the Public (Aug. 17, 1786), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES 
IREDELL 144, 148 (Griffith J. McRee ed., N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1857). 
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It has been a mere thirty-eight years since Paul Brest introduced the term “orig-
inalism” into constitutional discourse, and even fewer since self-identified “origi-
nalists” first began developing its theory while researching the original meaning 
of the Constitution, clause-by-clause. Originalist interpretation is still in an early 
stage of development; good-faith construction has only just begun. It is, however, 
essential to completing the originalist project.  
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